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er voting and activism, and shareholder litigation. This Article
presents a nuanced account, strongly supported both positively
and normatively, of shares and their proper treatment within corporate and general law. In the process, it sheds new light on other
areas in high currency, including corporate fiduciary law, corporate personhood, and the law of corporate purpose.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/6

2018]

Share Law

257

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

Introduction.............................................................................258
The Co-Op Case: Facts, Law and Judgment .........................263
Classifications in Corporate Law and the Uniqueness of
Shares .......................................................................................269
The Starting Point: Simplistic Perceptions of Shares...........278
Four Unsatisfactory Approaches to Shares...........................282
5.1. The Contract Approach ......................................................282
5.2. The Property Approach ......................................................285
5.3. The Trust Approach ...........................................................287
5.4. The Fiduciary Approach .....................................................290
5.5. Summary of the Four Approaches ......................................301
Equity as the Foundation of Share Law ................................302
6.1. Equity and Residuality: Two Links....................................303
6.2. Shares as Equitable Rights of Contractual Origin...............307
6.3. Other Perspectives on the Share-Equity Link: History and
Language ............................................................................310
Topics in Share Law................................................................311
Conclusion...............................................................................319

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

258

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 40:1

1. INTRODUCTION
Shares are fascinating. This type of security, issued by corporations,1 ignites the imagination for the perceived unlimited upside it
offers to the lucky investor who picks the “right” share. On a more
concrete level, shares form the spinal column of modern economy.
The total value of shares publicly traded on the world’s exchanges,
in 2017, was more than US$77 trillion.2 Peoples’ life savings lean
on shares, or share-related instruments and schemes.3 Share offerings finance the global expansion of human activity through corporations. In addition, shareholders—not other creditors—have a
substantial degree of control over the governance mechanisms of
corporations, through voting and other means, including access to
certain types of legal actions. Since corporations are immensely
important actors in today’s world, shareholders occupy a unique
position indeed.
Against this backdrop, it is troubling to realize how little we
know about shares. Other types of corporate obligations, such as
bonds, emanate from detailed contracts, defining the parties’ rights
and duties. Even where the contract itself is lacking, contract law
provides ample solutions. When we turn to the “share contract”—
the corporation’s constitutional documents4—we quickly discover
1
In this Article, “corporation” alternates between two meanings. Mostly, it
refers to several different types of artificial persons, which include the company,
the cooperative, the partnership and others, as far as the range of corporate laws
in a given jurisdiction allows. They include both for-profit and other-purpose
corporations. Related phrases, such as “corporate law,” should be accordingly
construed. More narrowly, a “corporation” is how Delaware and similar U.S. law
describes the type of entity which other jurisdictions, including Israel and the
U.K., call a “company.” See Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, ch. 1 (2018) [hereinafter: DGCL]. This duality is not problematic, since every
Delaware corporation is also a corporation in the broader sense. Where relevant
in this Article, it is clear that the reference is to Delaware corporations, rather than
corporations in the more general sense.
2
See Stocks traded, total value (current US$), THE WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD
[https://perma.cc/622W-XFFC] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). The numbers stated in
that source should be considered in addition to the value of shares issued by private, or non-publicly-traded, corporations.
3
See generally MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND
POLICY (2016) (discussing many types of investment schemes and institutions,
such as pension funds, securities firms, mutual funds, private equity funds and
derivatives, having shares as part of their asset portfolio or as their underlying
asset).
4 In corporate law, constitutional documents are certain documents required
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that it is a patently undetailed agreement,5 augmented only to a limited extent by statutory provisions.6 Furthermore, the very nature
of the obligation toward shareholders is “residual,” meaning that it
derives from the constantly fluctuating difference between the corporation’s assets and liabilities. Due to these factors, shareholders’
legal position cannot ever be well-defined in advance. Based on
what concepts, doctrines and principles should we examine sharerelated issues? As this Article reveals, not only contract law is unsuited to explain shares; so are the fields of property, trust and fiin order to create a corporation. Usually, they govern some fundamental aspects
of the corporation’s identity and affairs. They are also a normative source (mostly, a contract) binding the corporation and its residual claimants, the first of
whom are also its founders. See, e.g., DGCL § 101(a) (stating that every corporation shall have a certificate of incorporation); STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner,
588 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Del. 1991) (“[A] corporate charter is . . . a contract between
. . . the corporation and its shareholders. . . . The charter is also a contract among
the shareholders themselves.”); Companies Act, 5759-1999, §§ 15, 17(a), SH No.
1711 p. 189 (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Companies Act] (“Every company shall have
an article of incorporation . . . .”; “The article of incorporation is legally a contract
between the company and its shareholders and between [the shareholders] themselves.”). Constitutional documents are sometimes called “organizational documents,” see, e.g., Sylvia Ann Mayer & Manesh Jiten Shah, I Wish I May, I Wish I
Might... File Chapter 11 Tonight: Authorization and D&O Considerations When Filing
Chapter 11, WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG 2 (Nov. 2010), http://business-financerestructuring.weil.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Mayer_BK10_Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5SZ-Y5KD] (“[T]he organizational documents (such as the
charter, articles of incorporation, bylaws, limited liability company (“LLC”)
agreement, or partnership agreement) . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
5
In Delaware, the list of mandatory clauses for a certificate of incorporation
is very short: the corporation’s name, address, goals (“The nature of the business
or purposes to be conducted or promoted.”), authorized share capital and the
names and addresses of the corporation’s founders. See DGCL § 102. In Israel,
only four clauses are mandatory in every article of incorporation (the sole constitutional document required under the Israel Companies Act): the company’s
name, goals, authorized share capital and type of liability limitation (if any). Additionally, the article of incorporation has to be signed by the company’s founders
(its first shareholders). See Israel Companies Act §§ 18, 23.
6
Several sections of the Delaware corporate statute deal with shares, see
DGCL §§ 102, 109, 151–174, 201–205, 211–233, 241–245, in addition to other sections where share law issues are intermittently mixed in with others, such as the
merger and dissolution provisions in DGCL §§ 251–267, 271–285. For statutory
share law in Israel, see Israel Companies Act §§ 1, 15–24, 33–35, 57–91, 127–139,
176–193, 285–313. Importantly, most of these sections contain fairly broad statements and do not attempt to provide rules of conduct or decision even for known
types of share-related disputes, such as share dilution, withholding of dividends,
or unfair prejudice. Similarly, none of them explain how the rights attached to
shares are different from those attached to any other security or corporate obligation; none of these provisions address the unique nature of residual claims and
the problems they give rise to. The same is true of constitutional documents, even
when they are more detailed than the minimum statutory requirements.
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duciary law. Presumably, the share is a legal mystery. We are
seemingly unable to answer even a simple question: “why do
shares have value?” Yet, around US$80 trillion hinges on our answer.7
One reason for this gap is habit and routine. Dividends and
merger proceeds get paid, or not; shareholder voting effects
change, or not. It often feels as if corporations’ successes and failures translate directly enough into shareholders’ pockets. The
most familiar perception of shares comes from the secondary market: the trading of shares in a stock exchange, with their prices going up and down. Not enough attention is paid to the underlying
nature of shares, and the rules and principles governing them—in
short, to share law.
However, such attention is highly necessary. It is required in
order to grapple with very salient questions, such as shareholders’
power compared to that of directors, or the position of nonshareholder constituencies. Additionally, things do go wrong within the relationships that shareholders are parties to: for many reasons, the corporation’s fortunes might not translate into those of its
shareholders, or part of them. That happens constantly, and in
surprising ways. Due to their unusual characteristics, shares give
rise to a very wide range of possible situations. To realize how
broad that range is, it might be beneficial to take a look around the
globe.
In September 2017, the Supreme Court of Israel issued its decision in General Guardian v. Co-Op Blue Square Services Cooperative
Ltd. (In Liquidation).8 In that judgment, the Court held that the economic rights of shareholders cannot be taken away from them solely because they cannot be located. The Court ordered that, instead,
those rights (here, a liquidating dividend in cash, totaling approximately US$15 million) will be held in trust, for the benefit of the
unknown shareholders, for an unlimited period of time, to be
claimed by the unknown shareholders when they do appear.
The Co-Op decision sheds profound light on the fundamental
concepts relating to shares, not only in Israel, but under perceptions that evolved globally, since the birth of modern corporations.
The decision is illuminating precisely because the Court struggled
See supra note 2.
CA 238/16 Gen. Guardian v. Co-Op Blue Square Servs. Coop. Ltd. (In Liquidation)
(Sept.
10,
2017)
(Isr.)
[hereinafter:
Co-Op],
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/16/380/002/N21/16002380.N21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G5VJ-7K6Y].
7
8
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to reach this outcome. Israel has a developed economy, with a
common law system9 featuring highly sophisticated bodies of corporate and other private law.10 Yet, the Court could find no statutory, case law or contractual provisions clearly establishing that
shareholders are entitled to the economic rights arising from their
shares, and that this entitlement is unlimited in time. The opinion
of the Court, by Judge David Mintz, relied on an amalgamation of
written law provisions to reach the result.11 In a concurrence,12
Judge Daphne Barak-Erez attempted to formulate a broader principle: share rights are “property” rights, so that, like other types of
property, they enjoy strong, constitutional protections and cannot
be simply taken away from their owners.
In fact, the Co-Op Court operated as a court of equity, treating
shareholders’ claims as equitable rights, with the attendant results.
Mainly, in this case, shareholder rights were regarded as quasiproperty rights,13 similar to (albeit different than) a trust beneficiary’s rights. Like other equitable rights, those rights are both obligatory, toward the corporation; and quasi-proprietary, toward
9
See, e.g., AMIR N. LICHT, DINEI EMUNA’UT: HOVAT HA’EMUN BA’TA’AGID
U’BA’DIN HA’KLALI [FIDUCIARY LAW: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY IN THE CORPORATION AND
IN THE GENERAL LAW] 23–24 (2013) (“[T]he question of Israeli law’s classification

into a legal family, if it was ever controversial, is no longer in dispute. The answer is clear: Israeli law is common law . . . .”).
10
See generally INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL (Amos Shapira & Keren
C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995); ALON KAPLAN, ISRAELI BUSINESS LAW (1999); Itai Fiegenbaum & Amir N. Licht, Corporate Law of Israel (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
372,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050329
[https://perma.cc/LK8K-8CT7].
11
But see infra pp. 306–07 (describing how the equity approach, which the
Court perceives as obvious, “operates behind the scenes” of the decision and motivates the outcome).
12 See Co-Op at 28.
13
The concurrence, id., uses the term “property rights”, but that wording
(which does not appear in the opinion of the Court) is inaccurate. See infra Part 5.2
(explaining that shareholder rights toward the corporation’s net worth are not
property rights under property law). Alternatively, the concurrence might have
referred not to the rights contained in the share, but to shareholders’ rights toward
the share. The latter are, indeed, property rights. See infra pp. 275–76. Of course,
this does not resolve the legal content of the share itself. In Co-Op, shareholders’
property rights toward their shares were undisputed; the issue was their right to
receive a portion of the corporation’s assets, which is one of the rights embedded
in the share, and is governed by equity-based share law. Finally, the concurrence
might have referred to “property rights” in a constitutional law sense, which is
not congruent with private law classifications, and might include all manner of
economic rights, whether proprietary, equitable, or obligatory. In constitutional
and human rights law, such an approach is generally warranted.
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the shareholder’s respective portion of the corporation’s net worth.
Indeed, net worth is also known as “shareholders’ equity.” That is
one verification of the link between shares and equity; this Article
details many others. Current approaches to shares rely on various
legal disciplines, but none of these correctly and fully explain the
share phenomenon. Equity is the basis of share law, both in positive law (people act according to this approach since the birth of
modern corporations14) and normatively. The rights, and even the
existence, of shares and shareholders cannot be adequately explained any other way. Especially when dealing with such extent
of capital and such a scope of human interests, it is crucial to understand where shares come from, which actions pertaining to
them are permissible, and what the parties to share-borne relationships may expect.
This Article weaves together theoretical, doctrinal and comparative approaches, producing a consistent model of corporate law
and its subdivisions. To that end, this Article mainly surveys two
jurisdictions: the United States, the prominent arena of business
and legal activity in the world, and within it, as pertains to corporate law, mainly Delaware; and Israel, a country with a welldeveloped commercial sphere, legal system and common law jurisprudence, where the Co-Op case took place. Occasionally, this
Article turns to other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom,
which is historically the source of both American and Israeli law.
Many of the core concepts of corporate and other private law are
very similar among these jurisdictions—which makes any differences all the more telling.
The issues that comprise share law have been with us since the
dawn of corporations. This Article, for the first time, introduces
the concept of share law as a separate classification. It explores
both the theoretical foundations of share law, and many of the
practical topics it encompasses. This Article aims to assist future
inquiries by businesspeople, investors, lawyers, judges and scholars, as it presents a unified framework for resolving the many
questions that emerge from the share phenomenon. While doing
so, this Article also provides a more nuanced understanding of
such areas as corporate personhood and corporate purpose—other
paradigms that give rise to some of the most pressing issues facing
today’s corporate jurisprudence.

14

See infra Part 6.3.
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2. THE CO-OP CASE: FACTS, LAW AND JUDGMENT
Before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the land
was under British mandate rule. British law in force, which was
later absorbed into the law of Israel,15 enabled people to start a
regular business company; that was, as it still is in Israel, the most
common type of corporation. The law also afforded promoters the
option of establishing another, more unique type of corporation: a
cooperative. This type of entity, having strong roots in the U.K. itself,16 is a for-profit,17 separate legal person,18 with optional limited
liability for shareholders.19 These characteristics make a cooperative similar to other for-profit corporations. However, a cooperative also has several unique traits, intended, as its name implies, to
foster social cooperation among its shareholders or “members.”
These include, among other things, restrictions on the maximum
stake of the cooperative’s outstanding shares any single shareholder can own (set at 20%);20 a mandatory “one shareholder, one vote”
rule;21 and a rule excluding cooperative shares from being subject
to a lien,22 apparently intended to restrict their transferability to
outsiders not as committed to the cooperative’s goals as voluntary
members are.
One of those corporations, established in 1942 and continuing
to exist in Israel,23 is Co-Op Blue Square Services Cooperative Ltd.
15 See Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, § 11, O.B. (Official Bulletin) No. 2 p. 1 (Isr.) (the first legislative act enacted in the State of Israel; this section declaring that the existing law of the land continues to be valid, as part of the
law of Israel).
16
See generally JOHN F. WILSON ET AL., BUILDING CO-OPERATION: A BUSINESS
HISTORY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE GROUP, 1863-2013 (2013).
17
See Cooperatives Ordinance, §§ 39, 40, HEI (Laws of the Land of Israel)
Vol. 1 p. 336 (1933) (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Cooperatives Ordinance] (providing
rules in regard to the cooperative’s profits and the permissibility of various actions pertaining to them). Alternatively, a cooperative may be described as a
“mixed-purpose” corporation; one purpose within the mix is the pursuit of profit.
18 See id. at § 21.
19 See id. at § 4.
20 See id. at § 5(1).
21 See id. at § 16.
22 See id. at § 25.
23
See
Cooperative
Search,
MINISTRY
OF
ECONOMY,
https://apps.moital.gov.il/CooperativeSocieties [https://perma.cc/8E32-6EFH]
(last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (search for cooperative number 570004465; indicating
that the cooperative was founded on Mar. 4, 1942 and is in liquidation proceedings).
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(Co-Op). This entity was in the business of food retail and distribution of produce; before its liquidation, it mainly operated
through subsidiaries, many of them regular commercial companies.24 As the years passed, Co-Op amassed substantial earnings:
during its liquidation proceedings, its assets were sold for over 1.3
billion NIS (New Israeli Shekels),25 equivalent in 2017 rates to
about US$370 million.26
In 2002, Co-Op entered into court-ordered liquidation. The
reasons for that decision are not pertinent for current purposes, but
importantly, it is a non-bankruptcy liquidation: the corporation
maintained a positive net worth (shareholders’ equity), on the order of the sum of its assets. A cooperative is a for-profit, or at least
mixed-purpose corporation; incidental to that, the persons entitled
to receive its net worth, when it is distributed, are its shareholders.27 Accordingly, the liquidator, appointed by the District Court
of Tel Aviv, set out to distribute among shareholders the cash proceeds, gained from the sale of the corporation’s assets. Most
shareholders were indeed located and received their due fraction
of the corporation’s net worth. As a matter of course, that fraction
derives from the relation between the number of shares owned by
the shareholder and the number of outstanding shares.
There was a problem, however, which ended up at the heart of
the case. Due to the age of the corporation and the time passed
since the allocation of most of its shares—which were not publicly
traded—it turned out to be impossible to contact the owners of
about 10% of the outstanding shares. Many simply changed their
addresses. It is naturally apparent that many shareholders passed
away; this does not materially change the legal analysis, since their
See infra note 31, para. 3.
See Brief for Appellant, para. 6, CA 238/16 Gen. Guardian v. Co-Op Blue
Square
Servs.
Coop.
Ltd.
(In
Liquidation)
(Isr.),
http://www.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/KO_OP_FINAL.pd
f [https://perma.cc/8JWX-WUH5].
26
See
Exchange
Rates,
BANK
OF
ISRAEL,
http://www.boi.org.il/en/Markets/ExchangeRates/Pages/Default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P9XT-PKWL] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (search for the exchange rate on Sept. 10, 2017; indicating that on the day of the Co-Op decision, the
exchange rate was 3.504 NIS for 1 U.S. dollar).
27
See Israel Cooperatives Ordinance §§ 39, 40; Companies Ordinance (New
Form), 5743-1983, § 284, DMI (Laws of the State of Israel) No. 37 p. 761 (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Companies Ordinance] (providing rules in regard to the distribution
of profits to shareholders, during the corporation’s ongoing existence or during
liquidation).
24
25
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claims passed on to their heirs.28 The liquidator did manage to locate some previously unknown shareholders, and at present they
continue to show up, gradually.29
By 2015, the liquidation proceedings seemingly reached an impasse. All of the corporation’s assets had been sold. The liquidating dividend was fully distributed to the known shareholders. It
was perceived by many, including the liquidator and representatives of the known shareholders, that the chances of locating more
unknown shareholders were becoming slimmer as time passed—
although previously unknown shareholders did continue to show
up, at however seemingly slow rate.30 In 2015, the liquidator filed
a motion with the lower court, the District Court of Tel Aviv, asking to end the liquidation proceedings, wind up the corporation
and, most importantly, order the distribution of all remaining
funds between the known shareholders, irrevocably nullifying the
claims of currently unknown shareholders, even if they show up in
the future. The known shareholders—the only ones appearing before the court—agreed to this, unsurprisingly. The lower court
granted the motion.31 Its decision did not include substantive discussion on the merits of the unknown shareholders’ legal or equitable rights; rather, it was based on practical considerations, primarily the seeming inability to locate any more unknown
shareholders expeditiously enough, in light of the liquidation
stretching out for many years.32 The lower court’s decision also
took somewhat for granted the link between winding up the corporation and distributing the remaining funds to the known shareholders. It did not expound on another possibility: depositing the
remaining funds in trust, for the benefit of the unknown shareholders—although the appellant did raise this option before the
lower court.33
The General Guardian, an agency of the Israel Ministry of Jus-

28
See Inheritance Act, 5725-1965, § 1, SH No. 446 p. 663 (Isr.) (“Upon a person’s death his estate passes to his heirs.”).
29 See Co-Op, para. 5.
30 See id.
31
See LC (Liquidation Case) (TA) 1153/02 Co-Op Blue Square Servs. Coop.
Ltd.
v.
Levitt
(Nov.
26,
2015)
(Isr.),
https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/ME-02-1153-521.htm
[https://perma.cc/L7JD-JM44].
32 See id., para. 10.
33 See id., para. 9.
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tice entrusted by statute34 with representing the interests of property owners who are unidentified or unable to appear in court, timely appealed to the Supreme Court. The appellant also moved to
stay the distribution to the known shareholders, until the appeal is
decided. The Court granted this stay, soon after the appeal was
filed.35 The amount corresponding to the unknown shareholders’
claims totaled 53 million NIS36 (approximately US$15 million in
2017 rates37). At this stage, the unknown shareholders numbered
2,600,38 giving each a claim of about US$5,700. If the lower court’s
judgment was to stand, they faced an irreversible loss of this
amount.39
In September 2017, the Supreme Court issued its judgment in
the case.40 The opinion of the Court was written by Judge David
Mintz, a 2017 appointee to the Court, who previously served on
the District Court of Jerusalem and is renowned for his expertise in
bankruptcy law.41 Judge Yoram Danziger, the most senior member
of the three-judge panel, joined in Mintz’s opinion.42
The Court’s analysis begins with a survey of the law of cooperatives, noting, as mentioned above, the dual nature of this type of
corporation, which harbors both social and economic purposes.43
Importantly, the Court then mentions that a cooperative’s existence, like that of other corporations, is based on a constitutional

See General Guardian Act, 5738-1978, SH No. 883 p. 61 (Isr.).
See CA 238/16 Gen. Guardian v. Co-Op Blue Square Servs. Coop. Ltd. (In
Liquidation)
(Feb.
2,
2016)
(Isr.),
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/16/380/002/O05/16002380.O05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MY5P-WCU3].
36 See supra note 31, para. 9.
37 See supra note 26.
38 See Co-Op, para. 5.
39
If the funds had been distributed among the known shareholders, then
even if the lower court decision would have been later found to be in error, there
is absolutely no procedural mechanism, either in Israel or in other countries, including the U.S. and U.K., that enables one (such as a previously unknown shareholder) to pursue an action seeking remuneration from a very large number of
dispersed people (such as the tens of thousands known shareholders). A class action only works the other way around.
40 Co-Op, supra note 8.
41
See Justices and Registrars of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL,
https://supreme.court.gov.il/sites/en/Pages/Justices.aspx
[https://perma.cc/X2ZN-ZTBS] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
42 See Co-Op at 27–28.
43 See id., para. 19.
34
35
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document—the article of incorporation.44 This relates to the contractual approach to shares, discussed below.45 The Court goes on
to mention the strong link between company law and cooperative
law, stating that doctrines from other areas of corporate law may
be “imported” into cooperative law.46 This is consistent with the
methodology employed in this Article, viewing corporate law as a
general field, with different types of corporations, having similar
traits, entitled to similar treatment. In other words, although CoOp involves a unique type of corporation, its lessons are fully applicable to “regular” companies and other corporations.
The Court then delves into a prolonged analysis of various
provisions, gathered from cooperative law, bankruptcy law (occupying a large part of the opinion, even though the Court acknowledges the large positive net worth of the corporation, and that
shareholders are its intended recipients;47 this analysis might be
expected, considering that most liquidation activity arises in bankruptcy), comparative law from the U.K. and U.S., Hebrew law, and
even administrative law, but importantly, by the end of that part of
the opinion,48 the outcome remains to be clarified. Unsurprisingly,
neither of these sources provide clear rules as to the unique situation involving unlocated shareholders in a liquidating corporation,
entitled to large sums of money and facing (unbeknownst to any of
them) a motion to distribute those funds among other, known
shareholders.
Two statutory provisions mentioned by the Court come close to
providing a decisive rule in the case. The first, Section 372 of the
Israel Companies Ordinance, states that if some of the liquidating
company’s funds, held by the liquidator, are not duly claimed by
anyone within six months, they shall be deposited in a bank account; if the claimant later appears, the funds shall then be paid;
that section places no time limit on making the claim.49 However,
the Court mentions that non-shareholder creditors’ claims are timelimited, by other statutory provisions, which the Court declines to
apply to shareholders.50 Why are shareholders different? Also,
See id., para. 20.
See infra Part 5.1.
46 See Co-Op, para. 21.
47 See id., para. 2.
48 See id., paras. 25–64.
49 See Israel Companies Ordinance § 372.
50
The Court simply states that “a shareholder is not required to file a proof
of claim, since he is not considered as a creditor of the company but a participant
44
45
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what if Section 372 did not exist, or if it was less sufficiently worded (common predicaments of statutory law)? The second statutory
provision, Section 248 of the Israel Companies Ordinance, deals
with distributions to shareholders during the company’s liquidation, ordering as follows: “A sum that a [shareholder] is entitled to
due to being a [shareholder] . . . shall be taken into account in regard to adjusting the rights of all [shareholders] among themselves.”51 The Court invokes this provision to state that “there is
no place to benefit one shareholder at the expense of another.”52
Again, besides merely quoting the statute, the Court does not explain how shareholders are different than other creditors.53 Yet,
this short provision does allude to an important principle of equity-based share law: the equality between identical shares (and
hence, between equal shareholders).
The Court then announces the result: the lower court’s decision is overturned. The monetary rights of the unknown shareholders shall be held in trust, by the appellant, for each shareholder to receive whenever in the future they may appear.54
In a short concurrence,55 Judge Daphne Barak-Erez joins Judge
Mintz’s opinion. She also offers another explanation for the eternality of shareholders’ rights: “The rights of the unknown shareholders are property rights for all intents and purposes. These are
fundamental rights, which today even enjoy constitutional protection.”56 The concurrence also points out that “the known sharein it. Therefore, applying here the provisions relevant to a “creditor” would be
problematic.” Co-Op, para. 66. The term “participant” is synonymous with
“shareholder,” see id., para. 67. The Court does not elaborate on what gives rise to
this distinction between “creditor” and “shareholder.”
51 Israel Companies Ordinance § 248.
52 Co-Op, para. 66.
53 Notably, the pari passu equality rule, which Israel Companies Ordinance §
248 secures to shareholders, also applies to creditors under general and bankruptcy law. At the bottom line, the Court’s conclusion in paras. 65–67 of the opinion is
simply that “creditors” must file a proof of claim in liquidation proceedings, and
have a limited period of time to do so, while “shareholders” are different in both
respects. This conclusion is not explained by the statutory language or the Court’s
discussion, but see infra pp. 306–07 (describing how the equity approach, which
the Court perceives as obvious, “operates behind the scenes” of the decision and
motivates the outcome).
54 See Co-Op, para. 70.
55 See id. at 28.
56 Id. Regarding the use of the term “property rights,” see supra note 13. The
constitutional protection referred to comes from Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, § 3, SH No. 1391 p. 150 (Isr.) (“There shall be no violation of the property
of a person.”).
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holders never had any legitimate expectation grounded in law to
receive more than their respective fraction of the cooperative’s assets. They are not the unknown shareholders’ natural “heirs” or
their partners.”57 This, again, is an allusion to principles of equity,
such as the maxim “equity delights in equality.”58 In other words,
there is no difference between a known and an unknown shareholder, at least none that justifies forfeiting the latter’s rights and
giving them to the former.
This is a remarkable decision, reached from a remarkable factual background. It warrants further discussion. What is the fundamental basis of Co-Op—and indeed, of shareholder rights and
shares generally?
3. CLASSIFICATIONS IN CORPORATE LAW AND THE UNIQUENESS OF
SHARES
The difficulty faced by the Court in Co-Op arises, to a large extent, from a gap in the way we currently classify the structure of
corporate law. This Article explains how to close that gap. Its existence is somewhat perplexing, because lawyers must classify, and
do so all the time. Peter Birks wrote that “taxonomy is the foundation of most of the science . . . . Without it there is only a chaos of
unsorted information . . . . A sound taxonomy . . . is an essential
precondition of rationality. . . . Abolition of categories would entail
abolition of thought.”59 Pertinently, he warned that “[a]ll these are
wanting in common law systems.”60 Corporate lawyers, in particular, classify a lot of things: is the claim derivative or direct? Is the
transaction a merger or an acquisition? Was the breach of a duty of
loyalty or care? Which statutory sections govern the current situation? Yet, the question is whether they are classifying enough.
Today, when we discuss corporate law, we often perceive one
class of matters to “lie at its heart,” or even amount to all of corporate law.61 These matters can be termed corporate fiduciary law.62 It
Co-Op at 28.
MICHAEL LEVENSTEIN, MAXIMS OF EQUITY 103 (2014).
59
Peter Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 U. W.
AUSTL. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (1996).
60 Id. at 4.
61
An example of this partial view is provided by Goshen and Hannes, who
dramatically announce “the death of corporate law,” while actually describing
some changes in a specific area of corporate law—the balance of power between
57
58
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is the law governing the relationships between a corporation and
its fiduciaries, that is, the people who owe it fiduciary duties.
These include directors, other officers (such as managers), controlling shareholders and others. Such well-discussed and litigated
topics as self-interested transactions,63 appropriation of corporate
opportunities,64 and executive compensation65 are part of corporate
fiduciary law. Also within this field are some structural issues,
such as the prerequisites for a new director appointment, the operation of board committees, or the roles of independent directors.
Indeed, corporate fiduciary law is a necessary, defining component of corporate law, and there is a fundamental reason for
that: every corporation must have at least one fiduciary at any given moment. A corporation is a person, but not a natural person. It
does not have eyes and hands, or any other bodily and cognitive
capacities, entirely of its own. Therefore, it always has to operate
through someone else (the fiduciary), whom by design it entrusts
with acting in its benefit. While part of corporate law, corporate
fiduciary law is also part of the broader field of fiduciary law.66
The norms governing trustees, lawyers and many others,67 even in
non-corporate contexts, are part of fiduciary law. The unique duty
characterizing fiduciary law is the duty of loyalty. Its underlying
theme is the fiduciary principle: a fiduciary must single-mindedly
act to the advantage of the beneficiary, without being swayed by
directors, activist shareholders and courts. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes,
The Death of Corporate Law (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 402,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171023
[https://perma.cc/8EFR-CGMG]. That article treats a narrowing in the scope of
corporate fiduciary law (at least as it is traditionally perceived) as a decline of all
corporate law. In fact, shares and shareholders, with their voting and other rights,
are also part of corporate law, which is alive and well.
62
See, e.g., David Kershaw, The Path of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 8 N.Y.U. J. L.
& BUS. 395 (2012); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Principles
and Delaware Corporation Law: Searching for the Optimal Balance by Understanding
That the World is Not (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 40, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3044477
[https://perma.cc/ZBL3-UKS7] (using the term “corporate fiduciary law”).
63
See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 292 (5th ed., 2016).
64 See generally id. at 328.
65 See generally id. at 343.
66
Many volumes are devoted to general, rather than only corporate, fiduciary law. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011); LICHT, supra note 9;
LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW (2005).
67 For a partial list, see ROTMAN, supra note 66, at 15.
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any other interest.68 This is a much higher standard of behavior
than that pertaining to regular, arm’s length obligations, where
each party is free to benefit itself. It arises when the fiduciary
agrees to undertake this position, which involves the power to unilaterally affect the beneficiary’s affairs and legal standing. The fiduciary also has absolute advantage in information over the beneficiary. Due to these power and information asymmetries, the
regular law of obligations is insufficient, and a heightened type of
duty is invoked to protect the beneficiary’s interests, and more
generally, justice and fairness. As a result, fiduciary law is known
for its strictness toward fiduciaries.69 Given this rigidity, corporate
68
See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“[I]t is
elemental that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to
those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect . . . . This is a sensitive and “inflexible” rule of fidelity, barring not only blatant self-dealing, but also requiring
avoidance of situations in which a fiduciary’s personal interest possibly conflicts
with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty . . . . Included within this rule’s
broad scope is every situation in which a fiduciary, who is bound to singlemindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a duty of loyalty is owed, deals
with a person “in such close relation [to the fiduciary] . . . that possible advantage
to such other person might . . . consciously or unconsciously” influence the fiduciary’s judgment . . . .” (third and fourth alterations in original) (second brackets in
original) (citations omitted)); Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1996] EWCA
(Civ) 533, [1998] Ch 1 at 18 (appeal taken from Eng.) (describing the conditions
that give rise to a fiduciary relationship, stating that “[a] fiduciary is someone
who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another . . . in circumstances which
give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.”; also describing the main obligations imposed on fiduciaries, including that “[t]he principal is entitled to the
single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary.”). This Article generally employs the
American view of the scope of fiduciary duties, subsuming both loyalty and care.
In other jurisdictions, fiduciary law might be understood to encompass only the
duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of
Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013)
(“[U]nlike the United States, other common law jurisdictions including the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada generally do not conceptualize the duty of care
as “fiduciary” in nature.”).
69
See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“A public policy,
existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance
of his duty . . . . The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not
rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting
from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of
profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.”); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has devel-
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fiduciary law employs mechanisms, such as the business judgment
rule, meant to apply when the duty of loyalty has not been
breached, in order to promote the dynamics of corporate life and
other policy considerations that arise in the corporate context.70
However, corporate fiduciary law is only one part of corporate
law. The fiduciary-corporation relationship is one of the two main
relationships that uniquely define corporate law. When classifying
corporate law, we also encounter a set of issues that are nonfiduciary or only partly fiduciary in nature. We talk about these
topics in law school classes, practice them as lawyers, adjudicate
them and draft statutes that govern them. These issues are at the
heart of corporate law just as much as corporate fiduciary law is.
They deal with the second group of persons71 that must exist in relation to every corporation. In the broadest terms, that group may
be called “residual claimants.” Every corporation, at any given
moment, has at least one of those.72
The underlying reason for this is that a corporation’s life can
end, as it often does, whether through merger or liquidation.
oped a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.”).
70
See, e.g., Hamermesh & Strine, supra note 62, at 11 (“One of the earliest refinements in Delaware corporate fiduciary law was the articulation of the business
judgment rule.”). The article also discusses the rule’s application and some of its
justifications.
71
In most corporations, the same person can be a member of both groups,
that is, a fiduciary for the corporation and its residual claimant, at the same time.
72
The absolute necessity of both fiduciaries and residual claimants can also
be stated as follows: unlike a natural person, who is under no inherent duty to enter into any contract, a corporation, by design, must be party to at least two contracts, at any moment of its existence: one with its fiduciary (or fiduciaries) and
the other with its residual claimant(s). This stems from first principles, described
in this Part of the Article (the corporation, not being a natural person, is only able
to act through others; the need to determine who would be entitled to receive the
corporation’s net worth at the end of its life), and from written law. See, e.g.,
DGCL §§ 101(a) (stating that every corporation shall have a certificate of incorporation), 151(b) (instructing that after share redemption, the corporation must have
at least one outstanding share); STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130,
1136 (Del. 1991) (“[A] corporate charter is . . . a contract between . . . the corporation and its shareholders.”); Israel Companies Act §§ 15, 17 (stating that every
company shall have an article of incorporation, and that it is a contract between
the company and its shareholders); DGCL § 141(b) (stating that every corporation’s board must include at least one director); Israel Companies Act § 219(b)
(stating that every company must have at least one director). Regarding the contractual aspect of the fiduciary-corporation relationship, see, e.g., Bristol v. Mothew,
[1998] Ch 1 at 18 (stating that the fiduciary position has to be “undertaken” by the
fiduciary), meaning that the relationship is based on agreement—while also, by
definition, absorbing the norms of fiduciary law. Some of the fiduciary’s “employment contract” may also be, and often is, in writing.
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When that happens, the corporation’s interests (assets and noneconomic interests alike) do not disappear. If the corporation has
liabilities (including both economic and non-economic obligations),
then according to general law,73 its interests must first go toward
satisfying those. Yet only rarely, if ever, do a corporation’s interests precisely equal its liabilities. There must be some person entitled to receive the difference, or “residual.”74 That person is the residual claimant.
Crucially, a corporation has residual claimants throughout its
life, not only at or near its end. To explain this, the analysis above
needs to be expanded. The phenomenon can be first explained in
contractual terms: when a corporation is formed, its founders also
choose its first residual claimants (usually themselves); that choice
is found in the constitutional documents.75 Put another way, the
persons entering into that particular contract accept, as part of their
contractual bargain, the fact that they are the residual claimants.
Conversely, parties to other relationships with the corporation accept the fact that they are not the residual claimants. Second, the
continuous, indispensable existence of residual claimants can be
explained in terms of corporate purpose-setting: someone has to determine the ends toward which the corporation will act.76 This,
too, is part of a contractual bargain: the person who becomes a
party to the constitutional documents agrees to accept a position as
determiner of corporate purpose. Other creditors are not in that
position, nor should they be, as long as the obligations they are entitled to are being met. Furthermore, in the case of for-profit corporations, the residual claimant is also the indirect economic bene73
That is, law external to corporate law. In this sense, general law also includes bankruptcy law, which often dictates where corporations’ assets go when
their lives end. For discussion of the relation between general law and corporate
law, see infra notes 77, 142.
74
The residual might be negative. In non-limited liability corporations, the
analysis remains the same: residual claimants are entitled to receive the residual,
which happens to mean they will be burdened with new obligations, rather than
acquiring new rights. In limited liability corporations, when the residual is negative, residual claimants are legally entitled to forego it.
75
See supra note 5 (noting that constitutional documents must specify the
names of the first shareholders). With the transferability of shares, the residual
claim passes on to each subsequent shareholder.
76
This is done when a promoter (and soon-to-be residual claimant) selects a
certain form of incorporation, with a known, fixed purpose (a for-profit, nonprofit, or mixed-purpose corporation), see infra note 142. Additionally, and subject to
that fixed purpose, the residual claimant specifies the corporation’s goals in its
constitutional documents, see supra note 5.
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ficiary of pursuing those ends. From a deontological viewpoint, as
long as the rights of no one else are violated,77 there is nothing
wrong with having a person determine the corporation’s purpose
and goals and indirectly enjoy their attainment.
In a sense, a natural person can also be said to have, at any given moment, “residual claimants”: the person’s presumptive heirs.
They, too, are entitled to receive the future decedent’s “net worth”
(as their claim ranks below that of creditors) when the decedent’s
life ends. However, a natural person is different from a corporation in this regard, since heirs have no right to control the affairs of
the future decedent inter vivos. This results from an important ex77
Indeed, by definition, residual claimants cannot bypass, or impair the
rights of, non-residual creditors. Residual claimants always rank below creditors
in the priority order of claims for the corporation’s assets. The corporation must
fulfill, or at least be able to fulfill, all of its obligations to creditors, before it is legally allowed to hand out any economic benefit to its residual claimants. Furthermore, residual claimants themselves cannot validly do anything (such as
adopting a resolution in the shareholder meeting) that unilaterally impairs the
content of the corporation’s obligation to a creditor. These facts stem from the
very concept of residuality. They are also protected by mandatory provisions of
positive law, including general law (requiring every corporation, as any other
person, to meet its obligations), bankruptcy law (placing residual claimants at the
lowest level of priority, dictating that if the corporation’s obligations to creditors
are not fully met, residual claimants are not entitled to any value) and corporate
law, see, e.g., DGCL §§ 160(a), 170–174 (establishing mandatory rules to determine
when a corporation is allowed to make a distribution to its shareholders, requiring that distributions not “impair” the corporation’s capital, or that they be made
out of the corporation’s profits); Israel Companies Act §§ 301–305, 307, 309–313
(establishing mandatory rules to determine when a company is allowed to make a
distribution to its shareholders, requiring, without exception, that it maintain its
ability to meet all obligations to creditors). See also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 11 (1991) (“Equity investors are paid last, after debt investors, employees, and other investors . . . .
These equity investors have the “residual” claim in the sense that they get only
what is left over . . . .”). But see, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves
Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L. J. 1870, 1928–29 (2017) (criticizing that understanding of the relation between residual and non-residual claims). However,
that part of Chief Justice Strine’s article far from negates the concept of residual
claimancy. First, it conjures up an image of an “ultimate reckoning of accounts,”
id. at 1929, on which residuality presumably depends, while overlooking the
many concrete, continuously binding norms, some mentioned above, that support
the priority of non-residual creditors. Second, it points to problems with the enforcement of law in this area, not with its substantive content. Certainly, it is possible to break the law, for example by transferring wealth to shareholders while obligations to creditors are not being met. Yet, no one has a right to do so. Similarly,
a breach of contract does not modify the rules of contract law. Courts and other
enforcement mechanisms exist in order to prevent and address such violations, in
corporate law as in any other area.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/6

2018]

Share Law

275

tra-legal, philosophical distinction: a natural person is an end in
himself, free to determine his own fate and life purposes. In contrast, a corporation exists to pursue some purpose and goals determined for it by others. Of course, due to the limits of the corporation’s physical nature, there is simply no way it could determine
its own purpose and goals without other people, and the choices
they make. This does not undermine the corporation’s existence as
a separate person; it just means that an artificial person’s life purpose is chosen in a different manner than that of a natural person.
Moreover, the fixing of purpose, at the corporation’s “birth,” does
not change the fact that the corporation, through its fiduciaries
(and usually not its residual claimants), has extremely wide latitude in choosing its course of action, or “way of life,” within that
purpose.78
The logical chain laid out above leads to the inevitable existence of residual claimants, in respect to every corporation. Depending on the type of corporation, residual claimants can have
many names, such as “partners” or “members.” In some corporations, residual claimants are comprised of, and identical to, some
other group of creditors, as in “mutual insurance companies,”
where policyholders are also the residual claimants.79 In modern
corporations, residual claimants are mostly known as “shareholders”—persons who own a “share.” Like other securities, a share is
a “thing,” an object toward which property rights exist; a share has
owners. It can also be rented, pledged as collateral, and so on.
Simultaneously, the share itself is a bundle of rights:80 it confers on
its owner some obligatory rights, while attaching some obligations
to at least one other person. The economic magnitude of these
rights and obligations is equal to the residual interests of the cor78 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1989) (“[Directors’] broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability.”).
79
See, e.g., 2017 Annual Report, EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
CANADA
15
(Feb.
13,
2018),
https://cdn.equitable.ca/forms/unsecured/insurance/2017-Annual-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EU4P-4FYA] (showing “policyholders’ equity” as the only
type of equity in the balance sheet). Practically, this means that the residual
claimants have a dual contract with the corporation, giving rise to claims under
both general (contract and insurance) law and corporate law, including equitable
claims as discussed in this Article.
80
See Israel Companies Act § 1 (defining “Share” as “a bundle of rights in
the company that are determined in law and in the article of incorporation[.]”).
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poration—those left after all corporate obligations, of any kind, to
all non-residual claimants are satisfied, in practice or in capacity.81
Most importantly, the related concepts of “share” and “residuality” create a long, open list of unique problems. This stems from
the unusual, not easily explicable nature of residual obligations—
mainly, the inherent lack of any contractual or other legal mechanism to determine what the shareholders’ claim is, except for the
phrase “what is left after all obligations to other creditors are satisfied.” That phrase might seem straightforward, but it is not.
Shareholders’ claims are intricately tied to another person’s acts,
omissions, successes and failures. They ebb and flow with the corporation’s fortunes. This situation has no parallels in other legal
fields. In contract and property law, for instance, the claimant has
a claim toward something grounded in external reality, such as
concepts of money, time and place. An obligor might breach an
obligation, but these concepts exist independently of him. This
makes it comparatively easy for the claimant to ascertain and demand what is owed, for example, “one hundred dollars.” In contrast, shareholders can never accurately know the extent of their
claims, both because of information and power asymmetries to
their detriment, and because many things, some wildly unexpected, might happen to the corporation, or within the various relationships arising from the share (shareholder-corporation, shareholder-shareholder and shareholder-third party). Therefore, “the
claim attached to one percent of the corporation’s outstanding
shares,” or what should be considered as that claim, is far more
complex and problematic than “one hundred dollars.”82
81
Residuality characterizes shares by default. “Regular” residual claim
shares are often known as “common shares.” There also exist types of securities,
sometimes called “preferred shares” (although they can have many other names
and properties), that carry some contractual terms endowing their owners with
non-residual, or a combination of residual and non-residual, claims. Their owners
may, in fact, be regular creditors. See infra pp. 280–81 (discussing preferred
shares). This situation also occurs in U.S. mutual funds, where shareholders do
not own a residual claim share; rather, they own trust law claims toward a corporate trustee and a defined pool, or segment, of its assets. That definition, often in
terms of a certain investment strategy, appears in the contractual documents creating each class of “shares.”
82 These problems attach to the concept of shares at a very preliminary level.
For example, the number of outstanding shares is a starting point in any determination of shareholder rights in a corporation. It gives meaning to the content of a
single share, by establishing the relation between it and the entirety of shareholders’ claims. However, a shareholder might not even be able to reach that point
easily enough. It is possible that shareholders will have no knowledge of the real
number of outstanding shares a corporation has at a given moment, due to some
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This unclarity leads to an extraordinary range of possible situations. Some of these are between the corporation and its shareholders: for example, in the case of no dividend being distributed
for a long time; no legal right exists to demand distribution.83 Some
problems are among shareholders themselves, as in the case of a
dilutive allocation of new shares, which is an indirect transfer of
wealth from current to new shareholders; general contract law nowhere contemplates this situation.84 Some problems are between
shareholders and third parties, as in the case of harm done to the
corporation, and indirectly to shareholders’ claims toward it,
which for some reason cannot be corrected with legal action taken
by the corporation itself.85 Another example is harm done to the
administrative error or an information gap (such as a private allocation of shares
to a new shareholder, not timely and correctly reported to current shareholders,
for any reason). Israeli law partly attempts to address this situation, see Securities
Regulation (Private Offering of Securities in a Registered Company), 5760-2000, §§
2, 21, KT 6051 p. 834 (Isr.) (requiring approval by the stock exchange and a public
disclosure of the details of any private offering of shares by a public company).
This provision is meant to prevent information gaps, so that all shareholders
know of changes in the number of outstanding shares, including those resulting
from a non-public allocation. However, this regulation, like any other, can be
breached, intentionally or not. This possibility illuminates the crucial difference
between shares and non-share claims, as the latter are grounded in concepts (such
as sums of money) independent of the corporation.
83 Yet, corporate law recognizes and may provide remedy against an inequitable withholding of dividends. See, e.g., Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W.
131, 134 (Mich. 1890) (“Courts of equity will not interfere in the management of
the directors unless . . . they . . . refuse to declare a dividend when the corporation
has a surplus of net profits which it can, without detriment to its business, divide
among its stockholders, and when a refusal to do so would amount to such an
abuse of discretion as would constitute a fraud, or breach of that good faith which
they are bound to exercise towards the stockholders.”), quoted in Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919). More generally, “the court of equity is
at all times open to complaining shareholders having a just grievance.” Id. at 684.
84
Yet, corporate law recognizes and may provide remedy against inequitable dilution. See, e.g., Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006) (holding that
former minority shareholders, deprived of value by a debt conversion transaction,
can bring a direct claim against the former controlling shareholder; also holding
that in various circumstances, share dilution can give rise to both derivative and
direct claims); Feldman v. Cutaia, 956 A.2d 644, 655 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“A claim for
wrongful equity dilution is premised on the notion that the corporation, by issuing additional equity for insufficient consideration, made the complaining stockholder’s stake less valuable.”); CA 667/76 L. Glickman Ltd. v. A. M. Barkai Inv.
Co.
Ltd.
32(2)
PD
281
(1978)
(Isr.),
https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/LA-2-281-L.htm
[https://perma.cc/S8FL-P9SK] (affirming grant of injunctive relief to minority
shareholders, following a large allocation of new shares for consideration below
their real value).
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ability of the corporation to distribute rights to its shareholders, as
with limitations on dividends in the financial sector.86 In some situations, the third party might be the corporation’s creditors, as in
the case of an unlawful distribution, or in non-limited liability corporations. The third party might also be the corporation’s fiduciaries (directly, not derivatively), such as when the corporation is in
Revlon mode.87 Yet another group of such issues concerns those
third parties involved in facilitating the corporation-shareholder
link, such as banks, brokers, custodians, depositories, nominee
companies, and stock exchanges, without the proper services of
whom most shareholders would never practically enjoy their
rights.
These issues need to be dealt with in a methodic manner, based
on some unifying, underlying principles, as good law must strive
to do. Together, they comprise the field of share law.
4. THE STARTING POINT: SIMPLISTIC PERCEPTIONS OF SHARES
Yet, the amount of methodic treatment given to share law, especially compared to corporate fiduciary law, is surprisingly minimal. One omnipresent problem is under-definition. In the Delaware General Corporation Law, no definition appears of the terms
85 Yet, corporate law recognizes the derivative action, brought on behalf of a
corporation by a shareholder. See infra note 159.
86
See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://perma.cc/99R6-Q968] (establishing guidelines for implementation by national regulators, regarding, among
other things, limitations on banks’ and similar financial institutions’ ability to distribute capital to shareholders). This exemplifies a situation where the interests of
the corporation, as well as its fiduciaries, are not aligned with those of shareholders. The corporation and its fiduciaries get a “good excuse” to keep and control
more assets, rather than distribute them. Hence, they might be more aligned with
the third party (the regulator) who imposes the limitation. Conceivably, legislatures and other regulators can mandate any extreme limitation, even barring distributions altogether. They might do so in regard to any corporation, not just financial services providers. This illustrates an equity situation, where no “legal”
right exists (to be entitled to distribution), yet, an outcome where shareholders are
completely separated from their investment is clearly unjustifiable. Shareholders
might be able to challenge this type of regulation. Their claim would be direct,
not derivative. Such a challenge would require (on multiple fronts, from procedural standing to substantive arguments) a well-grounded explanation of shares
and shareholder rights. That explanation is provided in share law.
87 See infra pp. 298–300.
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“share” or “stock.” This may be attributed to the lack of an introductory definitions section in that statute, but it is also the result of
a deeper issue: that we think of the concept of a share as something “taken for granted,” requiring little analysis because we do
not really need to know what it is. Supposedly, the share is a black
box. We easily and offhandedly identify its “outputs,” such as dividends and voting rights, but we have no well-crafted idea of the
process that generates these particular outputs. The Delaware
statute is replete with no less than 662 mentions of the terms
“shareholder” and “stockholder”,88 granting them a central role in
many statutory provisions, without ever defining who they are or
what they possess. The American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance exemplify this problem even more strongly,
with an empty definition of an “Equity security” as “a share . . . or
. . . a security convertible [into a share.]”89 The reader is left not
knowing what a share, nor an equity security, actually is. The Israel Companies Act fares slightly better, when it defines a share as “a
bundle of rights in the company that are determined in law and in
the article of incorporation[.]”90 This, first, identifies the basic nature of shares: they are rights (and not, say, contracts). Second, it
creates a link between the share and another concept, the constitutional documents, so shares can arise only from that particular contract. If a security is not mentioned there, it is definitely not a
share.91 Yet, the statute fails to explain what are rights “in” another
person (indeed, that phrase is meaningless92), or what prevents a
corporation from also specifying the details of non-share obligations in its constitutional documents (indeed, nothing does).
Another example of this simplistic approach lies in how naturally we view the trading, on the same exchange floor, of shares issued by corporations that are incorporated in very different jurisdictions, or even legal traditions (civil and common law). The New
88
See DGCL (search for the phrases “shareholder” and “stockholder” over
the entire document).
89
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 1.20 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
90 Israel Companies Act § 1.
91
This is further embodied in the mandatory requirement that the authorized capital, which is the maximum number of shares the corporation can issue of
each class, shall be specified in the article of incorporation. See Israel Companies
Act §§ 18(3), 33, 34. Therefore, if a security is not mentioned, in the article of incorporation, as having a certain authorized capital, it is definitely not a share.
92 See infra Part 5.2.
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York Stock Exchange lists equity securities issued by corporations
from China,93 Germany,94 Israel95 and the U.S.,96 among many others, and they live unsuspiciously together. We perceive them just
as “shares,” rarely stopping to examine their insides. The corporate laws of these different places might treat shares in disparate
ways. Such differences can be important in multiple respects. For
example, only if a corporation has issued shares, not other securities, to the public, does it become a “public company,”97 with all
the massive legal ramifications that category entails. Being a
“share,” not something else, carries many other consequences, in a
manner that often takes for granted the ability to differentiate between shares and non-share obligations.98
Even when we do try to discern shares from other legal phenomena, a common method is to discuss them in terms of a list of
rights, or the benefits with which they usually endow their owners.99 That list might include dividends, liquidation proceeds,
merger proceeds, voting, access to certain information, and perhaps some court actions.100 However, first, this list is both short
and not always correct. It can be contracted around, leaving the
security owners with more rights or less, or highly modified ones;
93 See, e.g., Alibaba Group Holding Limited American Depositary Shares Each Representing
One
Ordinary
Share
(BABA),
NYSE,
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:BABA [https://perma.cc/6PRH-CGUM]
(last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
94
See,
e.g.,
SAP
SE
ADS
(SAP),
NYSE,
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:SAP [https://perma.cc/M8JQ-JPM9] (last
visited Oct. 26, 2018).
95
See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited American Depositary Shares
(TEVA),
NYSE,
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:TEVA
[https://perma.cc/SZK4-Z872] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
96
See, e.g., International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), NYSE,
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:IBM [https://perma.cc/9ZS7-KYXM] (last
visited Oct. 26, 2018).
97
See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 1 (defining “Public company” as “a company whose shares are listed on an exchange or were offered to the public . . . and
are held by the public[.]”).
98 See, e.g., supra note 88 and accompanying text.
99
See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 63, at 146 (introducing shares as
distinct from debt securities, by focusing on two rights, voting and dividends:
“Common stockholders elect the board. After the company has paid its expenses
. . . and [paid its debts to creditors], whatever is left over can loosely be said to
“belong” to the stockholders in the sense that it is available for the payment of
dividends.”).
100
See, e.g., Israel Companies Act §§ 183–191, 194(a), 320–321; Israel Companies Ordinance §§ 284, 330(1) (detailing various rights granted to shareholders).
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they might still be shareholders. A good example is preferred
shares. The term “preferred share” denotes a family of securities
that straddle the line between actual shares and other securities,
namely bonds. A preferred share, despite its name, might not be a
“share” in any substantive sense. Even when it is, its content is often markedly different than that of other securities called “shares;”
for example, it might not carry any voting rights. How do we tell if
something is a share or not?101 How do we determine the legal
treatment that should be given to a particular security? These
questions are part of share law, and its interaction with broader
concepts of corporate and private law. General, simplistic views of
shares do not suffice to explain preferreds, or to fully and fairly determine the rights of their owners—problems that recent scholarship has grappled with.102
Second, the “list of rights” approach fails to note an important
fact: a given corporation might not experience any rights distribution event (such as a dividend or liquidation) for an extremely long
time—in fact, a potentially unlimited period—yet, shares of that
corporation will have intrinsic value and people will buy and sell
them, for a price, at the secondary market. This is in contrast to
other kinds of obligations, which do have a maturity date, or otherwise limited lifetime. It is clear why bonds have value: their
owners have a contractual right to receive known sums of money
at known times. Shares carry no such rights; in fact, it is hard to
ascertain from any textual source (contract or law) what is the economic content a share carries throughout its existence. So, why do
shares have value? What is their intrinsic content? What claims
does a shareholder have, and toward what or whom?

101 A question of great practical importance, due to, inter alia, the special status that corporate law confers upon shareholders and not others, often by mere
reference to the word “share” or “shareholder,” presupposing the ability to differentiate between shares and other securities. See supra note 88 and accompanying
text (noting that the DGCL mentions the terms “shareholder” and “stockholder”
662 times, without defining shares).
102
Compare William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred
Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815 (2013), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response: Poor Pitiful or
Potently Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025 (2013) (articles presenting different views regarding the nature of preferred shareholders’ rights, on a spectrum
between equitable rights, similar to those attached to common shares, and contractual rights, similar to those attached to non-share corporate obligations).
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5. FOUR UNSATISFACTORY APPROACHES TO SHARES
These questions are traditionally answered using several approaches (that is, beyond the simplistic “black box” and “list of
rights” approaches outlined above). As the discussion below reveals, even these more developed approaches only examine the
topic via their own, entrenched perceptions. Some offer correct observations, but none is free of inaccuracies; none can serve as the
basis for a theory and law of shares. This Part surveys the four
main approaches invoked today to explain the share phenomenon.
As a unifying theme, it asks how the Co-Op decision might be justified, if at all, under each approach.
5.1. The Contract Approach
According to one common approach, shareholders are just a
group of creditors, who have paid large sums of money103 to enter
into a contract (the constitutional documents) which in itself is devoid of meaningful content. It includes no maturity date, no periodic payments, no financial covenants, and no right to sue under
general contract law even when the corporation is running badly
and the chances of getting a return become slim.104 It is a contract
for a residual claim, with all the attendant problems.105 This approach views shareholders as contractual parties, but with a largely unwritten,106 custom-based or implied covenant-based con-

103
See supra note 2. The amounts mentioned there are on a global scale, but
they are composed of the holdings of many separate shareholders, each the owner
of substantive rights that should be protected by legal norms and institutions, as
any other right.
104
In non-limited liability corporations, shareholders bear an even bigger
risk: ending up with shares of negative value, due to having to satisfy part or all
of the corporation’s liabilities themselves. See supra note 74. Non-residual creditors do not bear such a risk; if insolvency occurs, they stand to lose, at most, their
own claim. This further demonstrates the unique position of shareholders, compared to all other creditors.
105 See supra Part 3.
106
See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1989)
(“Complications arise in corporate transactions, however, because the relevant
“agreement” is generally unwritten, frequently ambiguous or contradictory and
often not an agreement at all.”). See also supra notes 5, 6.
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tract107 and with legal rights disproportionate to their economic investment. They are creditors having none of the protections of
contract law.
On the other hand, they might incur the downsides: in Co-Op,
one could argue that the unknown shareholders have “abandoned” or “slept on” their rights, which under contract law doctrine, is possibly sufficient to negate those rights.108
Furthermore, contract law generally provides a rich, welldeveloped doctrinal environment; a good example is the availability of remedy against an anticipatory breach of contract.109 However, contract law is largely built on the assumption that creditors
know, or can know (and prove), what they are entitled to. For
shareholders, no remedy against “anticipatory breach” is possible,
because the shareholder has nothing specific enough to anticipate.
Another important doctrinal problem is that under contract
law, “the drafting burden [is] on the party asserting the right[.]”110
Hence, it could have been claimed that the unknown shareholders
should have had, in Co-Op’s constitutional documents, express
clauses saying that they hold quasi-property rights, unlimited in
time, toward the corporation’s net worth; and regulating many
other situations that might occur, no matter how remote. Such
clauses are practically not found in any constitutional documents.
Similarly lurking are statute of limitations arguments, which cannot be raised as easily against owners of property or quasiproperty (equity) rights.111
107 Although the contract approach itself might not necessarily say so, equity
is the main source of the customs and implied covenants embodied in shares. See
infra Part 6.
108
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-309(1) (2018) (“The time for shipment
or delivery or any other action under a contract if not provided in this Article or
agreed upon shall be a reasonable time.”); Contracts Act (General Part), 5733-1973,
§ 41, SH No. 694 p. 118 (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Contracts Act] (“If no time has
been agreed on for the fulfillment of an obligation, it has to be fulfilled a reasonable period after the formation of the contract, at a time of which the creditor has
given notice to the debtor a reasonable period in advance.”).
109 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-610 (2018) (“When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a performance not yet due . . . , the aggrieved party may . . . resort to any remedy for breach . . . .”); Contracts Act (Remedies for
Breach of Contract), 5731-1970, § 17, SH No. 610 p. 16 (Isr.) (“If a party indicates its
intention not to perform a contract, or if it appears from the circumstances that
[the party] will be unable or unwilling to perform [the contract], the other party is
entitled to remedies according to this Act even before the date set for the performance of the contract . . . .”).
110 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 102, at 1820.
111
See, e.g., Peter Watts, Some Aspects of the Intersection of the Law of Agency

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

284

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 40:1

To a large extent, the contractual approach is associated with
the school of law and economics and the “nexus of contracts” theory. Under these disciplines, a contract is simply a contract; one
contract may differ from another in terms, but not in general nature. Hence, shareholders are presumably just another group of
stakeholders in the corporate nexus.112 It is worth noting that according to the nexus of contracts theory, the corporation itself is an
aggregation of contracts.113 However, that statement is wrong.
How can “a contract” (or any number thereof) sue someone in
court, own property, or do anything else? More correctly, the corporation is a person; it is not the nexus of contracts, but the central
party to the nexus of contracts.114
Of the four approaches discussed in this Part of the Article, the
contract approach, equally with the trust approach,115 is probably
the least wrong when it comes to shares. The share relationship is,
at a basic level, a contractual relationship between shareholder and
corporation.116 When a person owns a share, that person primarily
with the Law of Trusts, in EQUITY, TRUSTS AND COMMERCE 29, 45 (Paul S Davies &
James Penner eds., 2017) (“In many jurisdictions, limitation periods do not apply
to actions for failure to account brought against an express trustee.”).
112
See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 15 (1996)
(“[S]upplying capital to the firm is simply one of many transactional relationships
to which ownership can be tied, and there is nothing very special about it.”);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38
STAN. L. REV. 271, 274 n.8 (1986) (“There is no fundamental difference between
debt and equity claims from an economic perspective.”). The answer to this line
of argument is that, although non-residual creditors might sometimes lose part or
all of their positive law claim, this does not modify the claim’s intrinsic content,
which is not residual, is often fixed, is represented by some concepts (such as
money and time) external to the corporation, and is governed by some normative
framework external to corporate law. For creditors, what fluctuates is not their
claim’s content, but the probability of receiving it. Creditors’ rights may be negated when the corporation becomes insolvent, which is the exception; most corporations are not insolvent. The content of creditors’ claims can change only according to external law, such as contract or bankruptcy law. The rule, and the general
perception of being a “creditor,” is that creditors have a relatively stable claim,
and they usually get it. In contrast, residual claimants’ positive law claim is intrinsically non-fixed and entirely dependent on the corporation. Their claim is always fluctuating, even when the corporation is not insolvent, and even if it is very
successful. Therefore, shareholders are indeed special and different than nonresidual creditors.
113 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the
Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 365, 369 (1988) (“The corporation is
a nexus of contracts.”).
114 See infra Part 5.2.
115 See infra Part 5.3.
116 In addition to the other relationships arising from shares: the shareholder-
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owns a claim toward a corporation. However, by design, that
claim is exceptionally vague and ill-defined. It is never put well
into words—neither in contract, nor in law. It is far removed from
the concept of a contract as we normally think of it. As a result,
whenever we discuss the contractual approach, we must remember
that the “share contract” is singularly exceptional, among all the
corporation’s relationships. It should never be described in terms
of contract law alone. Rather, it is intertwined with another normative framework—equity. Part 6 of this Article expands on that
distinction.
5.2. The Property Approach
At the other end of the spectrum, some have argued that
shareholders “own” the corporation,117 or are the true owners of
the corporation’s assets.118 This approach is related to the “aggregate theory” of the corporation, which contends that a corporation
is just a grouping of other individuals, usually its shareholders.119
Property rights are eternal; they do not have a maturity date.
Under this approach, the result in Co-Op may be justified: property rights cannot be taken away, absent some exceptional circumstances, even if their owner fails to demand those rights or show
shareholder and shareholder-third party relationships. See supra pp. 277–78.
117 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992) (“In the first conception, the corporation is seen as the private property of its stockholder-owners.”); Katsuhito Iwai,
Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 592 (1999) (“[W]hat does a corporate shareholder own? The corporation, of course. It is the corporation itself as a
“thing” that a corporate shareholder legally owns. A corporate shareholder is literally a holder of a corporate share, a bundle of participatory and pecuniary rights
in the corporation.”).
118
See, e.g., VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE 2 (1882) (“[T]he rights and duties of an
incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons who
compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”), quoted in Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1458
(1987).
119
See, e.g., Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J.
COMP. L. 39, 42 (2000) (“The aggregate or partnership model of the corporation,
which was prevalent in the 19th century, assumed [a role as the “owners” of the
corporate enterprise] for shareholders . . . .” (citation omitted)). On the aggregate
theory, see generally Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of
a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 566 (1987).
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up in court to defend them. Certainly, they can be eliminated
much less easily than purely obligatory rights.
However, the property approach is also mistaken. A corporation is a person.120 It exists separately from any other person, including its shareholders. Like other persons, a corporation can enter into obligatory relationships and can own property. A
corporation is not and cannot be property. Shareholders do not
own the corporation; they own shares.121 While it is meaningful to
discuss the ownership of a right toward a corporation, it is unclear
what might it mean, in both philosophical and property law terms,
to “own” a corporation—another person, with interests and volition of its own.122 Furthermore, the corporation is the full owner of
its own assets,123 including that portion amounting to its net worth
120 See, e.g., DGCL § 122 (detailing a list of “powers” held by every Delaware
corporation, generally similar and often identical to the capacities of a natural person); Israel Companies Act § 4 (“A company is a legal person capable of any right,
duty and act that is consistent with its character and nature as an incorporated
body.”); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 453–54 (1882) (“This corporation, like
others, is created a body politic and corporate . . . . [It] may make contracts, commit torts, and incur liabilities, and may sue or be sued in [its] corporate name in
regard to all of these transactions. The parties who deal with [the corporation]
understand this, and that they are dealing with a body which has these rights and
is subject to these obligations, and they do not deal with or count upon a liability
to the stockholder whom they do not know and with whom they have no privity
of contract or other relation.”); Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) 30
(appeal taken from Eng.) (“[O]nce the company is legally incorporated it must be
treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“Unless its
articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual duration and succession in its corporate name and has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs . . . .”); ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 63, at 77 (“The corporation is
considered a separate person in the eyes of the law.”); John C. Coates IV, State
Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 806, 818–35 (1989) (discussing in detail the “natural entity theory” of the corporation); Schane, supra note 119, at 592–609 (providing legal and linguistic analysis of the concept of corporate personality).
121 See, e.g., YEDIDIA Z. STERN, HA’BA’ALUT BA’HEVRAH HA’ISKIT: TE’ORYAH, DIN,
METSI’UT [THE OWNERSHIP OF A CORPORATION: THEORY, LAW, REALITY] 129 (2008)
(“Shareholders, as their name also attests, hold a right of ownership in a share and
not a right of ownership in the company.”).
122 See id. at 136 (“The company is an entity with interests of its own, that differ from those of any other actor . . . . The company is meant to act independently
of any other entity to promote those interests.”); infra note 145 and accompanying
text.
123
See, e.g., DGCL § 122(4) (“[Every corporation created under this chapter
shall have power to] [p]urchase, receive, take by grant, gift, devise, bequest or
otherwise, lease, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, employ, use and otherwise deal in and with real or personal property, or any interest therein . . . [.]”);
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(shareholders’ equity). Shareholders, as other creditors may do,
have entered into a contract, not a possessory relationship, with the
corporation.124 That contract is the constitutional documents, along
with the legal and equitable norms they necessarily absorb. In
summary, a corporation is not property, and its own property belongs to it, not to its shareholders. Therefore, a property approach
to the nature of shares cannot hold.
5.3. The Trust Approach
The trust approach would turn to trust law, viewing the corporation125 as a trustee, where shareholders are the beneficiaries and
the corporation’s net worth is the trust property. Seemingly exemplifying this approach is A. A. Berle’s famous 1931 article.126
If this approach is correct, the Co-Op decision can be rather easily explained: shareholders have a trust claim toward their fractions of the corporation’s net worth; that claim, somewhat similar
to a property right as discussed above,127 does not have a maturity
date (unless otherwise specified in the terms of the trust; there was
no such stipulation in Co-Op’s constitutional documents), so
shareholders own a right that is unlimited in time.
Once again, upon closer inspection, both trust law and corporate law do not support this approach. First, trust law is conservative. It is geared toward different purposes than corporate law. By
default, the trustee has to maintain the trust property,128 not engage
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[Every corporation has
power] to purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold, improve,
use, and otherwise deal with, real or personal property, or any legal or equitable
interest in property . . . [.]”). The same proposition is implicit in Israel Companies
Act § 4. In addition, references to the company’s own property are spread
throughout that statute, which also never mentions any proprietary link between
shareholders and the company’s assets.
124 See supra notes 4, 72.
125
In a different variation, the corporation’s directors are the trustees or fiduciaries for shareholders. That approach may equally be refuted, see infra Part
5.4.
126
See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing that “all powers granted to a corporation . . . are . . . exercisable only for the . . . benefit of . . . shareholders”, and that this is analogous to
limitations on the power of trustees).
127 See supra Part 5.2.
128
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302 (2018) (instructing trustees as to
“authorized investments”); Trust Act, 5739-1979, § 6, SH No. 941 p. 128 (Isr.)
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in complex, risky activities, typical of the modern corporation. A
chief consideration in trust law is the welfare of the beneficiary. In
corporate law, shareholders are important, but their interests are
not nearly as overriding as those of trust beneficiaries.
Second, a trust is a narrowly and strictly articulated concept.
For example, in Israel, it is defined as “a relation to an asset according to which a trustee has to hold or act upon it for the benefit of a
beneficiary or for another goal.”129 The “asset”—some piece of
property—is a key component of any trust. Indeed, trust law is
property-oriented, but the modern corporation is not simply a
keeper of assets. It is an active and dynamic person, engaging in a
host of acts that are often unrelated to safeguarding shareholders’
investment. For example, when SpaceX develops a new type of
Mars-going rocket,130 besides being a risky use of corporate funds
(related to the first point above), it is also an activity that has absolutely nothing to do with the work of a trustee. Abiding by the
narrow strictures of trust law would not have allowed many modern corporations to exist, and would hinder the interests of both
corporations and shareholders.131
Third, there is little support in positive law to the concept of
the corporation being a trustee for shareholders. A survey of the
corporate statutes of Israel, Delaware, the MBCA, and the U.K. reveals that none of them offer such a proposition. Furthermore,
courts have repeatedly held that the corporation is not a fiduciary
for its shareholders.132 Since a trustee is one type of fiduciary,133 it
[hereinafter: Israel Trust Act] (“Those trust funds that are not required for [the
trust’s] ongoing needs, the trustee is obliged to hold or invest as is efficient to maintain the principal and make returns . . . .” (emphases added)).
129 Israel Trust Act § 1.
130
See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Musk: Atmospheric tests of interplanetary spaceship
could
happen
next
year,
SPACEFLIGHT
NOW
(Mar.
13,
2018),
https://spaceflightnow.com/2018/03/13/musk-atmospheric-tests-ofinterplanetary-spaceship-could-happen-next-year [https://perma.cc/9LJJ-P7VN].
Space Exploration Technologies Corp., also known as SpaceX, is a Delaware corporation.
See Division of Corporations - Filing, DELAWARE.GOV,
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/ecorp/entitysearch/NameSearch.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6GKQ-BNT4] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (search for entity
name “Space Exploration Technologies Corp.” or file number 3500808).
131
Cf. Kornhauser, supra note 106, at 1450 (“Unlike contract, which allows
much discrimination in allocating entitlements among parties to the agreement,
trust does not seem adequately flexible to explain the complex allocation of obligations and privileges among this web of actors.”).
132
See, e.g., In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 556,
573 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“A corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders . . . .”); Alessi v. Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 950 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Earthgrains
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is all the less plausible to see the corporation as shareholders’ trustee.
Fourth and very pointedly, even when Berle wrote of shareholders’ rights in trust, he did so by analogy. The analogy is to equity. Berle says so explicitly:
[I]n every case, corporate action must be twice tested: first,
by the technical rules having to do with the existence and
proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules
somewhat analogous to those which apply in favor of a [trust
beneficiary] to the trustee’s exercise of wide powers granted to him . . . .134
“Somewhat analogous” is far from “identical.” In fact,
throughout Berle’s paper, “equity” and its inflections appear more
frequently than “trust”: 52 and 38 times, respectively.135 Quite
plainly, Berle meant to say that shareholders have equitable, or
more-than-legal, more-than-contractual rights. The liberty Berle
took in using “trust” for the title of his article is partly understandable, because trust law is a branch of equity. A right in trust is one,
very common type of equitable right. Yet, as the discussion above
illustrates, trust law is a specific area of jurisprudence, adding its
own rules and conventions on top of those of general equity. Every corporation is an equitable obligor; not every corporation is a
trustee.136 The trust approach, like the contract approach, comes
[(defendant corporation)] owes no fiduciary duty to Alessi [(plaintiff shareholder)]. I will not require Earthgrains to remedy Alessi’s injury without a valid legal
theory for holding Earthgrains liable.”).
133
See, e.g., Trust Code Summary, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS
ON
UNIFORM
STATE
LAWS,
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Trust%20Code
[https://perma.cc/P4MD-J57Y] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (“A trustee is a fiduciary, sometimes described as the utmost fiduciary.”).
134 Berle, supra note 126, at 1049 (emphasis added).
135
See id. (search for the phrases “equit” and “trust” over the entire document). Moreover, many uses of the word “trust” in Berle’s article are as part of a
name, such as “Fidelity Trust Company”, id. at 1064, so the actual balance favors
“equity” even more.
136
Of course, a corporation can also become a trustee, usually by entering
into a trust contract. Some corporations, such as trust companies and money
managers, are primarily devoted to such activity. The trust beneficiary is an equitable but non-residual creditor of the corporation. The beneficiary’s rights are
grounded in a field of law (trusts) that is external to corporate law, and they relate
to some asset that is not entirely the product of the corporation’s fortunes. On the
distinction between residual claims and those grounded in external reality, see supra p. 276.
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relatively close to the truth, but still requires qualification. Even
when, as this Article urges, we adopt a broad, holistic view to protect substantive rights, precision is important.
5.4. The Fiduciary Approach
According to another approach, which presumably reflects
most law in the United States, what shareholders own is a direct
claim toward the corporation’s fiduciaries. For example, a common reading of the famous Dodge v. Ford decision137 implies that
directors owe their duties not only to the corporation, but also directly to shareholders. No other group of creditors enjoys those duties. This can be taken to mean that shareholders and directors are
parties to the same relationship, which gives rise to a heightened
duty toward shareholders, co-existing with directors’ duties toward another person—the corporation. Some Delaware cases
seemingly imply the same.138 This position accords with a pluralistic view of fiduciary law, which allows for the recognition of multiple, separate types of beneficiaries within the same fiduciary arrangement.
However, this approach, as well as the assertion that it reflects
current American law, are both incorrect. First, even if it did mirror U.S. law, the pluralistic view is globally an exception. Other jurisdictions, including Israel,139 the U.K.,140 and most civil law Euro-

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993)
(“[D]irectors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests
of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”); Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 979 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Directors
have an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and
the stockholders alike.”). But see infra pp. 298–300 (explaining that the mergers
and acquisitions context, where the cases mentioned in this footnote arose, is an
exception partly allowing for direct duties toward shareholders).
139 See Israel Companies Act §§ 252(a) (“An officer owes toward the company
a duty of care . . . .”), 254(a) (“An officer owes a duty of loyalty to the company . . . .”). The term “officer” includes a director, see Israel Companies Act § 1.
140
See Companies Act 2006 § 170(1) (UK) (“The general duties specified in
sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of a company to the company.”). See
also D. D. Prentice, Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF
TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 73, 73 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992) (“It is a
generally accepted principle of company law that directors owe their duties to the
company and not to the company’s creditors or to its shareholders . . . .”).
137
138
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pean countries,141 take the monistic view: directors and similar fiduciaries owe their duties only to the corporation. In turn, the corporation owes various obligations to others—contractual, tort, equitable, environmental, or any other kind. Like any person, the
corporation is required to obey positive law, including share law,
and meet its obligations. Yet, this has nothing to do with extending fiduciaries’ duties, beyond their duty to the corporation.142
Second, from a normative standpoint, this approach is bad law.
A core tenet of fiduciary law is that a fiduciary may not be the
servant of two masters.143 In other words, under fiduciary law, divided loyalty is breached loyalty.144 The interests of the corporation and its shareholders can and do diverge.145 Therefore, this du141
See Klaus J. Hopt, Directors’ Duties to Shareholders, Employees, and Other
Creditors: A View from the Continent, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 115, 116 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992) (“The general rule
in most European countries is that directors have direct duties and liabilities only
to their company.”).
142
This can be stated in terms of corporate purpose: the for-profit corporation’s purpose is the lawful pursuit of profit. See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 11
(“The purpose of a company is to act according to business considerations to maximize its profits . . . .”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“I cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that . . . seeks not to
maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation . . . .”). The
“lawful” part is not mentioned in these sources, but it is obvious: everyone must
obey positive law; even if a corporation wanted to have a non-lawful purpose, by
definition, law cannot give cognizance to such an attempt. Directors and other
fiduciaries are duty-bound to promote the achievement of the corporation’s purpose. As pertains to the corporation’s relationship with shareholders, this relates
to both the “lawful” (the corporation must obey share law) and the “pursuit of
profit.” When fiduciaries cause the corporation to not operate this way, they steer
the corporation away from its purpose and thus breach their duty to the corporation.
143
See, e.g., supra note 68 (citing judicial decisions holding that a fiduciary is
bound to act single-mindedly for the interests of the beneficiary); EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 38 (“[A] manager told to serve two masters . . . has been
freed of both and is answerable to neither.”).
144 See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 183 (“[T]he duty of loyalty can sustain only
one interpretation—the monistic interpretation. A pluralistic approach and a duty of loyalty are contradictory in the most basic sense—definitionally, in fact—so
an attempt to interpret and apply the duty according to this approach counters
[the duty of loyalty’s] principles and values. Such an attempt amounts to an elimination of the duty of loyalty . . . .”).
145 The benefit of shareholders is closely related, but not identical, to the benefit of the corporation. The two may diverge in various situations, including the
distribution of a dividend or a share buyback, the mergers and acquisitions context, or a decision on voluntary dissolution. This divergence was also examined
in a well-known Delaware Court of Chancery opinion. See Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (illustrating a situation where a corporation, its sharehold-
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ality is neither desirable nor practicable.
Third, this approach is structurally flawed. Even if shareholders did enjoy direct duties owed by directors, that would not be of
much help, because directors are not the owners of the corporation’s assets; the corporation is. If, for any reason, the corporation
loses a certain amount of wealth (an indirect loss for shareholders),
that amount does not necessarily go into directors’ pockets. This is
particularly true when the loss results from a breach of the duty of
care, rather than the duty of loyalty; or when it results from no fiduciary breach at all, but from the action of a third party, which directors could not practically have prevented. Moreover, the larger
the amount, the less likely it is that directors (or their insurers) can
or will fully compensate for it. In any case, the economic claim
held by shareholders is toward the corporation and its net worth,
not its directors and their net worth.
Fourth, this approach is also flawed from another structural
perspective. Shareholders and directors are not parties to the same
contract. Each director is party to a contract with the corporation,
an “employment contract” of sorts, heavily laden with terms of fiduciary law (often unwritten and implied). These contracts are initially entered into when the corporation is created and its first directors embark upon their roles.146 They are separate from another
contract—the corporation’s constitutional documents, also coming
into force the moment the corporation is formed.147 That contract is
recognized, either by statute or case law,148 to involve the corporation and its shareholders as parties. The one person who is party
ers and its creditors each have a different interest as to the same business decision). This non-identity is further reflected in the difference between various
“time frames” toward which the corporation may be oriented. The corporation
may operate for its long-term benefit, or some other time horizon lawfully determined by its fiduciaries. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571
A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[Directors’] broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability. . . . [A]bsent a limited set of circumstances . . . , a
board of directors . . . is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value
in the short term . . . .” (citation omitted)). While this should also benefit shareholders, as claimants toward the corporation and the residual of its wealth, it does
so in a manner that might be objectionable to some, or even the majority of,
shareholders. This is far from the pretense that the corporation and its shareholders are the same, have the same interests, or can be the object of the same duties.
146 See supra note 72.
147
See, e.g., DGCL § 106; Israel Companies Act § 16 (“A company’s article of
incorporation . . . is in force from the time of its incorporation.”).
148 See supra notes 4, 72.
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to both contracts is the corporation. This, too, makes plain that
shareholders’ rights come to them from the corporation.
Fifth, careful examination reveals that even Dodge v. Ford supports the monistic view: directors owe their duties only to the corporation. Dodge v. Ford never says that shareholders directly benefit from fiduciary duties,149 but only that shareholders are special,
compared to all other creditors. That is because “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end.”150 Clearly, the topic Dodge v. Ford entertains is the purpose of the corporation, not the identity of fiduciary law beneficiaries.
The rights of shareholders are channeled through the corporation—they are a product of the existence and organization of the
corporation. They do not directly flow from directors, whom
Dodge v. Ford instructs as to carrying on the business of the corporation.
Even when not relying on Dodge v. Ford, for example in Delaware,151 the “direct fiduciary” interpretation is misguided. Given
the weight of positive and normative evidence against a fiduciary
approach to shares, as presented in this section, decisions and other materials to such effect should be read accordingly. Where “duties to the corporation and its shareholders,” or similar language, is
employed, its correct construction is “duties to the corporation,
who in turn owes to shareholders.” This reading fully conforms
with existing law, while correcting a certain imprecision, which
tends to occur for several reasons. To begin with, shareholders’
claim is closely linked to the corporation’s well-being, which directors are duty-bound to advance. The more the corporation
achieves its purpose, usually the greater the benefit of shareholders,
assuming correct operation of share law. This close relation, between the welfare of residual claimants and that of the corporation,
might easily motivate the inaccurate wording. Courts write as if
the two are identical, so there is no “translation” process between
them, and there is not much difference between saying “the corporation” and “its shareholders.” As this Article demonstrates, that
assumption is untrue. The relation is not an identity; equating the

149
In fact, the word “fiduciary” is never mentioned in the decision. See
Dodge v. Ford.
150 Id. at 507 (emphases added).
151 See supra note 138.
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two is, at most, a general metaphor.152
The phrasing inaccuracy might also arise from the fact that
shareholders’ rights are grounded in equity-based share law, and
equity is closely related to fiduciary law. In essence, courts are using “fiduciary” as code for “equity.” They are trying to convey
that shareholders are not regular, arm’s length creditors, but equity
claimants, with more-than-legal, more-than-contractual rights, justified by power and information asymmetries, similar to those
found in fiduciary relationships. That is entirely accurate; yet, it
does not turn shareholders into fiduciary law beneficiaries. Fiduciary law and equity are not synonymous. Different types of equity claimants exist.153 This distinction has far-reaching practical implications. Fiduciary law is strict. With the duty of loyalty at its
heart, it requires the fiduciary to self-abnegate and to treat all beneficiaries with the same, extremely high standard of conduct.154
Loyalty is not a matter of degree. Equity, the taxonomical parent
of fiduciary law, operates more broadly: it can inject flexibility
where required. It enables us to fine-tune the concept of shareholders, recognizing they are separate from the corporation, and
cannot be the object of the same duties, while also realizing they
are different from non-residual creditors, and must be protected
appropriately. In fact, Delaware law submits to this distinction. It
concedes that direct duties, owed by directors to shareholders, are
an exception, arising only in situations such as those invoking
Revlon duties.155 Moreover, the Unocal and Revlon standard of re-

152
See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 199 (“[T]he [duty of loyalty] itself is toward the company. Shareholders are beneficiaries in a conceptual and indirect
manner . . . .”); Paul L. Davies, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Individual Shareholders, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 83, 83–84 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992) (discussing “the doctrine that the duties of directors are
owed to shareholders collectively” in a way that reveals no practical difference
from duties “to the company”; further mentioning that “directors’ duties . . . involve obligations owed . . . [to a] group not normally limited to the existing shareholders of the company”, but also including future and “potential shareholders”—which confirms that the only actual, identifiable person, to whom those
duties can run, is the company). See also supra note 145. A purpose-based formulation of corporate law can easily bridge this conceptual gap, by clarifying that the
fiduciary’s duty, toward the corporation, is to promote the achievement of the
corporation’s purpose, which is the lawful pursuit of profit, which in turn (by operation of share law) also benefits shareholders. See supra note 142.
153 See infra pp. 303–05.
154 See supra notes 68, 69, 144; infra pp. 304–05.
155 See infra pp. 298–300.
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view is an “intermediate standard”156 of “enhanced scrutiny”,157
above the business judgment rule, but below the entire fairness required by the duty of loyalty.158 This is precisely the flexibility afforded by equity, and forbidden under fiduciary law. Delaware
itself, the seeming focal point of “direct fiduciary” language, in fact
adopts a nuanced, equitable approach to share law.
Sixth, another proof that even the American (and specifically
Delaware) view is monistic, as in other jurisdictions, comes from
the distinction between derivative and direct actions. If directors
owed directly to shareholders, or if the corporation’s “middleman”
status was otherwise eliminated, there would be no difference between harm to the corporation and harm to its shareholders. Every
lawsuit against directors (or any other defendant, for that matter)
could then be brought as a direct action, in the name of shareholders. In reality, the existence of, and insistence on, derivative actions demonstrate that only the corporation is the beneficiary of directors’ duties. Shareholders may assert a breach of those duties
only indirectly, on behalf of the corporation. Practically, this distinction is extremely consequential, as any plaintiff who tries to
navigate the unique procedural hurdles of derivative litigation
quickly learns.159
156 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard
for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247,
248 (1989) (“[T]he Delaware courts’ most recent response to the tension between
the intrinsic fairness standard and the business judgment standard in the takeover
context [is a]n intermediate standard of review mandating that management’s defensive tactics must be “reasonable in relation to the threat posed” by a hostile offer.” (citation omitted)).
157
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
184 (Del. 1986) (discussing “the enhanced scrutiny which Unocal requires of director conduct.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(“When a board addresses a pending takeover bid . . . there is an enhanced duty
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred.”).
158
See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 156, at 247 (“[T]he intrinsic fairness test[ does] not seem adequate [(due to over-strictness)] when courts must
evaluate defensive measures that implicate . . . [management’s] loyalty to shareholder interests.”). If management really owed to shareholders a full duty of loyalty, the same as it owes to the corporation, then according to fiduciary law principles, see supra notes 68, 69, 144, it would be impossible to diverge downwards
from the entire fairness test. Clearly, then, that is not what management owes to
shareholders.
159
For the rules governing the distinction between direct and derivative actions, and the pretrial stages of a derivative action in Delaware, see Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004) (holding that the
distinction between derivative and direct claims turns solely on “who suffered the
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Furthermore, not only shareholders can file derivative lawsuits;
sometimes, creditors can do so as well.160 In any case, the action is
brought on behalf of the corporation and for the corporation’s benefit.
The fundamental idea behind Gheewalla161 is that just like shareholders, if creditors are to be righted for a wrong they suffered,
they have to address the corporation; their rights are channeled
through the corporation; they do not have direct claims toward anyone else. The ultimate, indirect outcomes of fiduciary duties and
their breach can be complex (such as harm to creditors, rather than
or in addition to shareholders), but those duties are owed to the
corporation, who is itself the distributor of wealth (or other legal
effects) to both shareholders and creditors, and the object of claims
by them.
Seventh, contrary to the common yet mistaken reading of
Dodge v. Ford and the “direct fiduciary” Delaware decisions, multiple other landmark cases and leading authorities, from Delaware
itself, support the same proposition as this Article: the corporation
alleged harm” and “who would receive the benefit of any . . . remedy”); Rales v.
Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933–34 (Del. 1993) (determining whether to allow a derivative action to proceed, where the board that would consider the pre-suit demand
is not the same board that committed the alleged harm); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571
A.2d 767, 775–76 (Del. 1990) (holding that by sending a demand letter, the plaintiff
concedes that the board’s decision not to pursue the action should be reviewed
under the business judgment rule, thereby practically negating the plaintiff’s derivative claims; thus, establishing a universal non-demand rule, where the adjudication on the merits of a derivative action is centered on the issue of demand excusal in the pretrial, motion to dismiss stage); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814
(Del. 1984) (establishing the test to determine whether a demand on the board is
excused prior to filing a derivative action). See also infra note 244. In Israel, every
derivative action involves a preliminary certification stage, consisting of a trial in
itself, whereby the court determines if the plaintiff may represent the corporation
and proceed to litigate the main case. In that preliminary stage, the court is instructed to consider, first, whether conducting the lawsuit would be in the benefit
of the corporation (taken to require a prima facie showing of a cause of action) and,
second, whether the plaintiff acts in good faith. See Israel Companies Act § 198(a).
Similarly to Delaware, the actual adjudication on the merits usually occurs in the
preliminary stage. The main idea is that derivative actions are different, and usually more complicated to bring and maintain, than direct actions.
160
See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 204 (allowing creditors of a company to
file a derivative action if it arises from certain causes of action, mainly unlawful
distribution to shareholders); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (“[I]ndividual creditors of an insolvent
corporation have no right to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty
against corporate directors. Creditors may nonetheless protect their interest by
bringing derivative claims on behalf of the insolvent corporation . . . .” (emphases
omitted)).
161 930 A.2d 92.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/6

2018]

Share Law

297

is the beneficiary of directors’ duties, while shareholders have a
claim toward the corporation, derived from its well-being—in any
case, a claim different than that which the corporation holds toward its fiduciaries.162
Eighth, to be certain, shareholders also do not normally owe fiduciary duties to one another. This is especially true with “regular,” non-controlling shareholders, not otherwise acting in fiduciary capacity (for example, the tens of thousands known
shareholders in Co-Op).163 That is so for a good reason: contrary to
a fiduciary position, share ownership carries far more rights than
duties. This conforms with the generally held perception of shares,
arising mainly from the fact that shareholders pay for their shares
and correctly expect to become “creditors” or claimants, not the
opposite (debtors or obligors). Even those shareholders who are
fiduciaries owe their duties to the corporation.164 What all share162
See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 (“It is well settled that directors owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation. When a corporation is solvent, those duties may
be enforced by its shareholders, who have standing to bring derivative actions on
behalf of the corporation because they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation’s growth and increased value.” (first and last emphases added) (citation omitted)); Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (distinguishing shareholders from the corporation, in the context of discerning direct claims from derivative claims);
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[Directors’] broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of
action . . . designed to enhance corporate profitability. . . . [D]irectors, generally,
are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interest[.] . . .
[A]bsent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors . . . is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short
term . . . .” (citation omitted)); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The
Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L. J. 629, 636 (2010) (“[T]he
director’s job demands affirmative action—to protect and to better the position of
the corporation. . . . [E]very act must be taken for a proper corporate purpose[.] . . .
[A] loyal fiduciary must protect the corporation . . . .” (emphases added) (citation
omitted)).
163
See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 192(a) (stating that all shareholders must
act “in good faith”, which is merely a recitation of the general normative standard
applied to every act in private law, by any person, at any time—that is, a nonequitable, non-fiduciary standard, not specific to shareholders. This standard
originates from Israel Contracts Act §§ 12, 39, 61(b)); infra note 165.
164
See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 193 (specifying three types of shareholders, mainly a “controlling shareholder” and a shareholder having decisive power
in a shareholder meeting, who owe a duty of fairness to the company); Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (“A director is a fiduciary. . . . So is a dominant or
controlling stockholder or group of stockholders. . . . Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or
stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its
inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested there-
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holders do owe to one another is some set of equitable duties.165
Consistent with a recurring theme of this Article, those duties are
equitable, but not fiduciary; they are part of share law, not fiduciary law.
The important difference between the fiduciarybeneficiary and shareholder-shareholder relationships has also
been pointed out in scholarship.166
Ninth, while there are certain situations where directors can be
said to have a direct duty toward shareholders, they are the exception, not the rule. These situations, in the U.S. generally known as
“Revlon mode,” arise mainly in the mergers and acquisitions context, when a corporation is nearing the end of life in its current
form—a “breakup” or a “sale of control”, in the language of the
Paramount decisions.167 This is an equitable construct, acknowledgin.” (citations omitted). Regarding the quote’s final words, see supra pp. 293–95
(explaining that where “duties to the corporation and its shareholders,” or similar
language, is employed, its correct construction is according to the monistic view));
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *63 (Del. Ch. June
21, 1991) (“[W]hen a shareholder, who achieves power through the ownership of
stock, exercises that power by directing the actions of the corporation, he assumes
the duties of care and loyalty of a director of the corporation.”).
165
See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 192(b) (“A shareholder shall not act with
unfair prejudice toward other shareholders.”). In Israel, this is the only statutory
duty that applies to all shareholders (besides the non-shareholder-specific good
faith duty, see supra note 163). The law of unfair prejudice is not part of fiduciary
law. See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 211 (“[T]he law of unfair prejudice is not
based on fiduciary relations supported by duties of loyalty.”).
166 See, e.g., Tan Cheng-Han & Wee Meng-Seng, Equity, Shareholders and Company Law, in EQUITY, TRUSTS AND COMMERCE 1, 9–10 (Paul S Davies & James Penner
eds., 2017) (“[I]f the stated basis is that shareholder power must be exercised not
for the benefit of the shareholder but for others, this is not the correct principle
that operates in a shareholder dispute . . . . This is because there is a fundamental
difference in the relationship between partners inter se and between partners and
the partnership (which is fiduciary), and between shareholders inter se or between shareholders and the company (which is not). Accordingly, . . . the test of a
power that must be exercised for the benefit of another is not an appropriate test
where shareholders are concerned.”).
167 See Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“[A]bsent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors . . . is not under any per se
duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term[.] . . . [T]here are, generally
speaking . . . , two circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties. The first . . .
is when a corporation initiates [a transaction] involving a clear break-up of the
company. . . . [The second is when] a target abandons its long-term strategy and
seeks an alternative transaction also involving the breakup of the company. . . . If,
however, the board’s reaction . . . is . . . not an abandonment of the corporation’s
continued existence, Revlon duties are not triggered . . . .” (citations omitted)); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47–48 (Del. 1994)
(“There are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders
than a sale of control or a corporate break-up. Each event represents a fundamental (and perhaps irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from
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ing that when directors make decisions affecting shareholders’
own legal and financial positions, in a manner not channeled
through the corporation, the person standing to gain or lose from
directors’ actions is not the corporation, but shareholders. This
“channeling principle” might apply in situations outside strict
Revlon mode;168 at any rate, these are exceptions. We then extend
the usual scope of director obligations, importing fiduciary duties169 into the ad hoc director-shareholder relationship. As if to
emphasize that this is the exception, some of the important authorities discussing the rule—duties toward the corporation—do so in
the mergers and acquisitions context.170 Outside such situations,
a practical standpoint. It is the significance of each of these events that justifies . . .
focusing on the directors’ obligation to seek the best value reasonably available to
the stockholders . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
168
Such situations include those where the corporation’s interests have become extremely minimized, as in Revlon itself, or where the corporation’s interests
are simply not being affected. Consider, for example, an interference with shareholders’ voting rights, see Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661
(Del. Ch. 1988) (requiring “compelling justification” for “board acts done for the
primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power”, while
discussing fiduciary duties owed by directors to shareholders). In these unique
situations, the effect on shareholders is unrelated to what the corporation does, or
what happens to it. The corporation does not vote in its shareholder meeting;
shareholders do. The remedy goes to the shareholders, not the corporation. Generally, fiduciaries might commit actions that affect shareholders’ standing in relation to the corporation—in other words, the very content of their rights under
share law. Shareholders should be appropriately protected even where fiduciaries’ usual duties, to the corporation, are not at issue.
169
But see supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text (explaining that because Unocal and Revlon give rise to an “intermediate standard”, lower than entire
fairness, it is not the uniformly high standard imposed by the duty of loyalty).
170 See, e.g., Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“Delaware law imposes on a
board of directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.
. . . This broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of
action . . . designed to enhance corporate profitability. . . . [D]irectors, generally, are
obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interest . . . .” (emphases added) (citation omitted)); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“[Once the company was for sale,] [t]he
duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate
entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’
benefit. . . . The directors’ role [before the change was] defenders of the corporate
bastion . . . .” (emphases added)); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 954–58 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he board’s power to act derives from its fundamental
duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders[.] . . . [T]he board had a supervening duty to protect the corporate enterprise,
which includes the other shareholders, from threatened harm.” (emphases added)); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 802 (Del. Ch.
1988) (“[T]he duties the board always bears [are]: to act . . . in the good faith pursuit of corporate interests and only for that purpose.” (emphases added)).
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particularly during the “going concern” phase of corporate existence, directors owe their duties to the corporation,171 and shareholders’ rights come to them from the corporation. In any event,
figuring out what directors owe shareholders (in monetary or other
terms) necessitates an inquiry of share law. It requires answers to
questions such as “why do shares have value?” and “which rules
and principles apply in this share-related situation?”, all relying on
a satisfactory theory and law of shares.
Under the fiduciary approach, the holding in Co-Op is not only
unjustifiable, it is impossible. That is because in Co-Op, there was
no breach of fiduciary duty by anyone. The liquidator performed
his job diligently, trying to locate as many shareholders as possible.
Other fiduciaries, such as the corporation’s administrative personnel through the years, also cannot be held responsible: the failure
to keep an updated shareholder register is the corporation’s own act,
not any fiduciary’s. As a rule, corporations bear their own rights
and duties; it is the corporation who had a duty to correctly maintain this register.172 There is also no reason to assume this was
some fiduciary’s personally interested act, since none would have
gained any benefit from one group of shareholders, rather than another, receiving the funds. Even if the corporation’s fiduciaries
somehow did wrong, the third point of discussion in this section
applies:173 these people would likely not have US$15 million, or
anything close to that, just lying around; nor are most of them alive
today; nor would damages of such scope be an appropriate sanction for a relatively small omission (at the time it was made); nor
could the fiduciaries (or their heirs) be required to pay such
amounts to the unknown shareholders, when the obvious solution,
which fits the parties’ pre-liquidation expectations, is the one
reached by the Court: just keeping the corporation’s money undistributed, allowing the unknown shareholders to claim it when they
do. All along, the shareholders’ claim was toward funds in the
corporation’s, not any fiduciary’s, pocket. Clearly, Co-Op is a cor171
See, e.g., ROTMAN, supra note 66, at 512 (“By analogy with the application
of Revlon duties, it would seem logical that so long as the corporation remains viable as a going concern, directors and officers retain fiduciary duties to act in the
corporation’s best interests.”).
172
See Israel Companies Act § 127 (“A company shall administer a shareholder register.”), § 130(a) (“In the shareholder register [the following] shall be
registered[:] . . . The name, identification number and address of each shareholder,
all as submitted to the company[.] . . .”).
173 See supra p. 292.
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porate law case, but not a fiduciary law case. It is a case in share
law.
5.5. Summary of the Four Approaches
As we now see, in reality, none of the approaches surveyed
above is the law. Indeed, like many174 other creditors, shareholders
are parties to a contract with the corporation. It is perfectly correct
to say that shareholders are “creditors”—as long as we keep in
mind that they are a singularly unique type of creditors. Their contract is inherently coupled with extra-contractual, equitable norms.
Without this qualification, and the special treatment stemming
from it, the shareholders’ contract would be practically meaningless, and certainly not align with the parties’ actual expectations
and the generally accepted perception of shares.
It is also true that shareholders have some sort of claim related
to the corporation’s net worth, but that claim is not a property
right, nor is it identical to a trust beneficiary’s claim toward a trustee or trust property.
Finally, it is correct that shareholders have rights different than
those of all other creditors, but they do not have direct claims toward directors or other fiduciaries. Rather, the corporation itself,
who is the beneficiary of its fiduciaries’ duties, is the vessel
through which shareholders’ rights flow.
In summary, the rights, or even the existence, of shares and
shareholders cannot be adequately explained by contract, property,
trust or fiduciary law. This should hardly serve to weaken or obscure them: “Doctrinal formalism has been no match for human
nature’s inclination towards fairness and justice.”175 So, where do
they come from?

174
Many, but not all, creditors have a contract with the corporation. For example, tort law injured parties are involuntary creditors, having no such contract.
They may be grouped together with non-residual contract creditors in that the
rights of both arise primarily in law, not equity.
175 LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS 150 (2001).
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6. EQUITY AS THE FOUNDATION OF SHARE LAW
Equity is the field of jurisprudence meant to promote justice
and fairness in situations where regular “law” is unfit or insufficient for that purpose.176 As this Article demonstrates, that is precisely what happens with shares: first, shares have characteristics,
such as textual (contractual and legal) ambiguity and the phenomenon of residuality, which make them impossible to comprehend
in familiar legal terms. Second, all the seemingly applicable areas
of law (contract, property, trust and fiduciary law) are maladjusted
to treat shares. Trust and fiduciary law are branches of equity.
Yet, equity is a field in its own. Other branches of it may also exist.
As it turns out, an important branch of equity is share law.
There are many angles from which to explore the link between
shares and equity. This Part of the Article turns to the following:
residuality, the equity contract, and historical and linguistic connections.

176
This idea is inherent to equity, both conceptually and historically. See,
e.g., Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of Equity (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 119 (1942) (explaining Aristotle’s view of equity as a supplement to
law, whenever the latter has to be rectified for achieving justice); F. W. MAITLAND,
EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 3–6 (1909) (describing the rise
of equity as a response to inadequacies in the administration of law, especially
what we today call power and information asymmetries: “Though these great
courts of law have been established there is still a reserve of justice in the king.
Those who can not [sic] get relief elsewhere present their petitions to the king and
his council praying for some remedy. . . . Very often the petitioner . . . complains
that for some reason or another he can not [sic] get a remedy in the ordinary
course of justice and yet he is entitled to a remedy. He is poor . . . , his adversary
is rich and powerful . . . , or has by some trick or some accident acquired an advantage of which the ordinary courts with their formal procedure will not deprive
him. . . . The complaints that come before [the Chancellors] are in general complaints . . . which [the ordinary courts] ought to redress. But then owing to one
thing and another such wrongs are not always redressed by courts of law.”). The
analogy, between Maitland’s plaintiff and the modern shareholder (if not for the
protections of equity), is apparent. For some of Maitland’s insights on the development of corporate law and shares, see F. W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in
STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 75 (David Runciman & Magnus Ryan eds., 2003)
[hereinafter: Maitland, Trust and Corporation] (chronicling the origins of trusts and
the rise of corporations). See also Joshua Getzler, Frederic William Maitland - Trust
and Corporation, 35 U. QUEENSLAND L. J. 171 (2016) (exploring the background and
key thesis of Maitland’s work).
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6.1. Equity and Residuality: Two Links
The concepts of “equity” and “residuality” are related in two
ways. First, equity is a normative framework needed in a situation
where a claimant’s rights are residual, wholly dependent on another person. That is because, similarly to other equitable relationships, the claimant is severely disadvantaged in power and information, compared to his obligor (in this case, mainly the
corporation). The second link between “equity” and “residuality”
lies in the fact that equity is a residual normative framework—
simply, it is the one left over after all others fail to accommodate a
given situation.
First, a shareholder, while not a trust177 or fiduciary law beneficiary,178 is situated in a very similar position to these types of actors.
Members of all three groups may be termed “equity claimants.”
That is because, like the other two, a shareholder is not a regular
contractual party. A shareholder is inherently disadvantaged vis-àvis his obligor—in this case, mainly the corporation.179 This inferiority is in terms of both power (the ability to affect one’s legal position) and information (the ability to know what that position is).
This results from the unique phenomena explicated above:180 first,
the share contract (constitutional documents) is exceptionally undetailed, compared to other contracts regularly entered into in private law. Second, the shareholder’s claim relates to the everfluctuating residual, or difference between the corporation’s assets
and liabilities, so it is not grounded in any fact of external reality;
the shareholder’s claim is entirely dependent on the corporation.
As with any person, the corporation’s fate can result from its own
deeds, or from acts done to it by others. In any case, shareholders
can hardly do anything to control these actions. They have some
governance power, but it is practically limited to appointing other
people and hoping they, and the corporation, do the right thing.
Shareholders must accept what the corporation hands them, good
or bad, with little recourse to any legal claim. Yet, that is not what
See supra Part 5.3.
See supra Part 5.4.
179
In addition to the other relationships that arise from shares: the shareholder-shareholder and shareholder-third party relationships. See supra pp. 277–
78. In each of these, as well, a shareholder might stand in a position of power or
information asymmetry to one or more of the other parties.
180 See supra Part 3.
177
178
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the parties opt for: the corporation ought to try and succeed, with
an understanding that this will also protect and grow shareholders’
investment. Shareholders give their money to the corporation,
who now owns it; yet, there is a sense that shareholders continue
to own an interest in it, somehow different than that of a “regular”
creditor. A mismatch exists between the parties’ rights and the legal tools available to address them. Therefore, justice and simple
reason require that the share relationship not be seen as a regular,
arm’s length relationship under “law” only, but rather, as one that
invokes the protections of equity.
The substantive content of shareholders’ equitable claim is similar, albeit different, than that of other equity claimants. For instance, under trust, fiduciary, and share law, the claimant enjoys a
quasi-proprietary right toward property owned, held, or managed
by another person. This is not a full proprietary right under property law; it is also not a mere obligatory right under contract law.
It is something in-between, and the questions pertaining to it are
answered in the field of equity.
The major difference between the various equity claims is that
trust and fiduciary law impose the duty of loyalty, but share law
does not. That duty requires total self-abnegation by the trustee or
other fiduciary,181 while a corporation can, and in many respects
must, operate for its own benefit.182 Another illustration of nonfiduciary equity lies in the operation of courts: standards of review
for actions affecting shareholders per se and the corporation are different.183
Shareholders’ lack of fiduciary claims can become very consequential: take, for example, a shareholder facing bankruptcy,
which would be avoided only if the shareholder received a dividend from the corporation. If the corporation, or even its directors,
were fiduciaries for the shareholder, they would have to pay the
dividend, consistent with fiduciary principles of self-abnegation
and acting only in the beneficiary’s interest.184 However, such duty
See supra notes 68, 69.
See supra notes 142, 145.
183
See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text (explaining that although
direct duties toward shareholders are often referred to as “fiduciary” duties, they
may give rise to less stringent, “intermediate” standards, inconsistent with fiduciary law principles).
184
One might respond that the “fiduciary” (whether the corporation or its
directors) presumably owes duties not to any specific shareholder, but to shareholders “collectively” or to a “fictional shareholder.” See, e.g., Davies, supra note
152; Caleb N. Griffin, The Hidden Cost of M&A, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 70, 80 n.24
181
182
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clearly does not exist in positive law, or normatively: the corporation is meant to pursue its own benefit and its own plans (which a
large dividend might upset); corporate decisions, including those
on dividends, must accord with the corporation’s interests.
Of course, that the corporation is not shareholders’ fiduciary
does not mean it can do whatever it wishes, even if that harms
shareholders, or otherwise violates the terms of the relationship.
The strong link, between the corporation’s well-being and that of
its shareholders,185 is guarded by equity. The translation of the
former into the latter is achieved through the workings of share
law, many of which are discussed in Part 7 of this Article.
Second, equity may be viewed as a residual normative framework,
designed to provide conceptual and doctrinal infrastructure for
dealing with situations where other fields of jurisprudence are insufficient, irrelevant, or would lead to incorrect results. As this Article demonstrates, the origin and nature of shares, and the rights
of shareholders, cannot be explained through “law”—contract and
property law.186 Even two branches of equity—trust and fiduciary
law—have specific characteristics that similarly preclude them
from serving that purpose: trust law is built on narrow definitions
and does not correspond to the nature of the modern corporation;187 corporate fiduciary law is indeed an important part of corporate law, but it pertains to a separate relationship, that involving
directors and other fiduciaries, to which the corporation is party,
but shareholders are not.188 The corporation itself also is not

(2018) (citing sources that discuss the “fictional shareholder”). However, such a
statement is meaningless in terms of fiduciary law, which deals with very strict
obligations to actual persons. Practically, duties to a “fictional shareholder” are
indistinguishable from duties to the corporation (an actual, identifiable person).
There is no reason, then, to misapply the unique norms of fiduciary law, by misidentifying the parties to the various relationships. “Fictional shareholders,”
“shareholders as a whole” and similar phrases simply place us back in the framework of share law, as discussed in this Article.
185
Most of the time, that link appears obvious: a gain for the corporation is
an indirect gain for shareholders. Practically, they may realize it through such
events as the distribution of a dividend, or selling their shares in the secondary
market. In any case, these are channeled through share law: shareholders cannot
reach any of the corporation’s assets or interests, except through their shares and
the legal framework governing them. Furthermore, it is possible for the corporation’s interests to diverge from those of its shareholders. See supra notes 86, 145.
186 See supra Parts 5.1, 5.2.
187 See supra Part 5.3.
188 See supra Part 5.4.
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shareholders’ fiduciary.189 Shareholders have claims similar to
those found in fiduciary law (in that both are more-thancontractual, non-arm’s length), but uniquely, no one owes them a
duty of loyalty. Yet, they invest fortunes, in money or effort, to acquire their shares.190 Due to this and related reasons (such as defending legitimate expectations and encouraging further investment), they undoubtedly have rights, deserving of protection. We
face a situation where four different, well-developed areas of law
cannot serve as the foundation of those rights. What is left is equity itself, or more specifically, equity-based share law.
The Co-Op decision illustrates both of these links between equity and residuality. First, the Court treats shareholders’ claim toward the rights arising from their shares as having some quasiproprietary traits. This is exemplified by the Court not mentioning
any statute of limitations or similar issue, which is consistent with
the rights of an equity claimant, rather than a purely contractual
party.191 Of course, this is also demonstrated by the final result in
the case: the Court treats the unknown shareholders’ rights as
quasi-proprietary, first, when it defends their claims’ continued existence (rather than distributing the money to the known shareholders), and second, when it orders the creation of a trust for an
unlimited period, where the unknown shareholders’ funds will be
held. Since proprietary rights, unlike obligatory (contractual) ones,
are generally unlimited in time (they do not have a “maturity
date”), this conforms with a quasi-property, or equity, approach.
From another typical perspective, the Court recognizes that the
unknown shareholders are a weak, disadvantaged party. Despite
possessing a considerable financial claim, they do not even know
about it. The unknown shareholders are completely unable to defend their interests. The power and information asymmetries here
are apparent. They are even more extensive than in most equity
cases. These shareholders truly need the protection of equity, and
the Court does not turn its back on them: it acts as a court of equity.192
Second, Co-Op also exemplifies how equity serves as a residual
See supra Part 5.3, specifically supra note 132.
See supra notes 2, 103.
191 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
192 Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“[T]he court
of equity is at all times open to complaining shareholders having a just grievance.”).
189
190
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normative framework. That is because the Court’s decision simply
cannot be explained any other way. As the opinion shows,193 the
Court never finds it necessary to delve into substantive contractual,
property, trust, or fiduciary law analysis. Even if it tried, Part 5
above illustrates how these approaches are simply incorrect, or
(especially the fiduciary approach) completely irrelevant to the
facts of the case. Furthermore, despite the Court browsing through
many of those, no statutory—that is, “law”—provisions actually
establish the outcome. Effectively, the Court takes the equity approach for granted. The treatment of shareholders as equity claimants operates behind the scenes of the decision: what the Court is
essentially doing, throughout the lengthy opinion, is trying to find
some legal exception to the equitable rule of shareholders’ morethan-contractual, quasi-property rights. When the Court finds no
such exception, it does what it perceives as obvious, and orders the
conservation of the funds for the unknown shareholders’ benefit.
6.2. Shares as Equitable Rights of Contractual Origin
Another way to explain the link between shares and equity,
briefly discussed above,194 employs a fairly straightforward idea:
shareholders have equitable rights, bundled into shares, because
the corporation and its shareholders have entered into a contract
that calls for such rights. In other words, corporate constitutional
documents are a contract that also gives rise to an equitable relationship. This statement is nothing far-reaching: a trust contract195
with a trustee196 operates the same way.197 The contract-equity duality naturally extends into corporate law, as the Delaware Court of
See supra pp. 266–69.
See supra pp. 284–85.
195 Also often called a “deed of trust” or “trust instrument.”
196
See, e.g., Israel Trust Act § 2 (“A trust is created according to law [or] according to a contract with a trustee . . . .”).
197 The argument here is not that an equitable relationship is purely or mainly contractual (and can be contracted around), as has been claimed in regard to
fiduciary relationships, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract
and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425 (1993). Rather, the argument is that morethan-contractual obligations can be imposed with the aid of a contract. People can
agree to be bound by certain legal norms, including the norms of equity. In other
words, the parties can create a stone that the contract cannot lift. More accurately,
they invoke a pre-existing stone: equity.
193
194
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Chancery had vigorously emphasized.198
In effect, the parties voluntarily summon the norms of equity to
be part of their relationship. They do so not in explicit writing—it
would be unusual to find constitutional documents that state “the
norms of equity are part of this document for all intents and purposes”—but, in accordance with contract law rules of construction,
through intent and implied covenants. The parties, necessarily unaware of the extremely wide range of eventualities that might occur (as Co-Op vividly illustrates), absorb equity into their agreement, because that is the only way to deal with this lack of ability
to look into the future.199
The injection of equitable norms into the shareholders’ contract,
and not into others (such as bonds), is justified because a residual
claim contract simply cannot ever be detailed enough to protect
shareholders from the possibilities that uniquely attach to their
claim.200 Even if it could, constitutional documents are just not
very detailed in practice, due to the parties’ natural efficiency motives, pushing them to comply with legal dictates and not much
more.201 Unlike shareholders, bondholders have a claim to a certain (or contractually determinable) amount of money, at a certain
(or contractually determinable) date. That claim is grounded in
facts of reality—concepts of money and time—that lie outside the
corporation.202 If a bond contract is breached, bondholders will
promptly know that and will likely seek remedy, emanating either
from the bond itself or from external legal default rules.203 Similar198
See, e.g., Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 664 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“An essential aspect of our form of corporate law is the balance between law (in the form of
statute and contract, including the contracts governing the internal affairs of corporations, such as charters and bylaws) and equity . . . . Stockholders can entrust
directors with broad legal authority precisely because they know that that authority must be exercised consistently with equitable principles . . . .” (citing Berle, supra note 126; Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971))).
199 See, e.g., Tan & Wee, supra note 166, at 12 (“The common thread . . . is that
reasonable shareholders would not generally contemplate the occurrence of such
circumstances within companies of which they are members (even though there
was no express discussion or agreement between them on such matters) and equity will therefore not allow the exercise of strict legal rights to maintain this uncontemplated status quo.”).
200 See supra Part 3.
201 See supra notes 5, 6.
202
On the distinction between residual claims and those grounded in external reality, see supra p. 276.
203 See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 232 (“In the [arm’s length] relationship [between debtor and creditor], the person who suffers a breach is basically aware of
his interests, and when a breach occurs he knows about it—that his property or
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ly extensive laws also protect other creditors, such as employees.
In the share context, however, neither the contract itself nor legal
default rules are designed to answer all questions that can possibly
arise, or even those that frequently do arise. Shareholders must
have equity in their contracts because otherwise asserting a
“breach” would almost never succeed. On purely legal-contractual
grounds, it is impossible to prove that a dividend “should” be distributed,204 or that shares have been allocated to new owners for
“too low” a price,205 or that shareholders, as in Co-Op, have “quasiproperty” rights, unlimited in time. Equity is well-versed in precisely these kinds of inconvenient arguments.
As this Article shows, the majority of share-related concepts
and norms are simply not written anywhere; they seem to be taken
“for granted.” It is as if the parties are somehow told: “you do not
have to think of this in advance; when questions arise, people just
know what to do.” Of course, people would not know what to do,
if not for equity, designed to provide answers that cannot be found
elsewhere. As a result, like every director employment contract206
implicitly absorbs the norms of corporate fiduciary law, every corporation’s constitutional documents implicitly absorb the norms of
equity-based share law.207
The outcome reached by the Court in Co-Op precisely squares
with the above. Every time a Co-Op shareholder assumed this position, the corporation and the shareholder agreed to a contract.
That contract is the corporation’s constitutional documents, and
these contain equitable norms. It is implicitly perceived by the parties that shareholders have an equitable claim, which, as Co-Op
demonstrates, makes it a quasi-property claim. Accordingly, it is
unlimited in time, and is “stronger” than a mere contractual claim
in other respects as well.208 Indeed, discussing “quasi”-property
rights, which straddle the line between several legal disciplines, is
body were damaged or that his contract was not fulfilled.”).
204 See supra note 83.
205 See supra note 84.
206
That is the contractual arrangement, unwritten in part, that governs the
relationship between a director and the corporation. See supra note 72; supra pp.
292–93.
207
Cf. Tan & Wee, supra note 166, at 15 (“Although a contractual approach
has judicial support, it operates only by analogy and it must not be forgotten that
the basis of the court’s jurisdiction lies in equity. Any contractual analysis must
ultimately be able to support relief in equity.”).
208 See supra p. 283.
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not easy. Yet, aside from being time-honored,209 this usage is unavoidable, due to the complexity of human affairs. Situations and
relationships, commercial or otherwise, are not made to fit into
pre-existing molds.210
6.3. Other Perspectives on the Share-Equity Link: History and
Language
The close relation between the concepts of shares and equity
can also be examined from two more perspectives: historical and
linguistic. Historically, modern corporations developed as creatures of equity. By the 17th century, “joint stock companies” began
to surface in England.211 In practice, they were very similar to
partnerships.212 The analogy is that in a partnership, partners have
the power to influence the legal position of each other, in various
ways not pre-defined in contract or otherwise, thereby necessitating the protections of equity; in a company, that power is vested
mainly with the company itself, and acts toward its shareholders.
However, partnership law only partly and ineffectively responded
to the needs of rapidly growing corporations during the 18th and
19th centuries.213 As a result, “real” company law developed, retaining equity as its foundational concept.214 Corporate law
changed considerably over the years, but equity remains at its
core.215 As this Article illustrates, the range of situations that
shareholders can find themselves in is remarkably wide. Equity
responds to this fact as it guides the daily practice and adjudication
of corporate law.
209
Cf. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, supra note 176, at 109 (“quasi is one of
the few Latin words that English lawyers really love . . . .”).
210 Cf. LEVENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 61 (“All law, no matter its content or era,
is flawed . . . . Equity could not plausibly surmount this very human limitation,
but its charge is nevertheless to attempt the impossible.”).
211 See, e.g., Tan & Wee, supra note 166, at 1.
212 See id.
213 See id. at 2.
214
See id. at 4 (“[A]s the business organisation that was adopted in early
company law was based on a fusion of partnership and trust law, together with
the law of agency, which were all heavily infused by equitable doctrines, company law was susceptible to the influence of the law of equity.” (citation omitted)).
215
See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Sample v.
Morgan, 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007) (two judicial decisions, reached 88 years
apart, both pointing to equity as a fundamental norm of corporate law).
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The linguistic connection between “shares” and “equity” is
practically taken for granted. This link does not necessarily prove
that the two should be related—other sections of this Article deal
with that. Rather, it is one proof that they are related, on a very intuitive, culture-wide level. This connection can be seen in the interchangeable use of the phrases “share,” “stock,” and “equity.”
For example, the word “equity” might simply be used instead of
“shares.”216 A textbook might introduce the various types of financial instruments that a corporation can issue, grouping shares under the title “Equity Securities”.217 The phrase “shareholders’ equity” is equivalent to “the corporation’s net worth,” or assets minus
liabilities (obligations to non-residual creditors). “Shareholders’
equity” is very widely used and appears regularly in, among other
places, corporations’ financial reports218 and the press.219 At a web
forum devoted to English linguistics, an explanation, generally
similar to that presented in this Article, was offered in regard to the
link between the two concepts.220
7. TOPICS IN SHARE LAW
What else is part of share law? The previous Parts of this Article mainly discuss the equitable principles of share law. Yet, these
are only a fraction of that field. This Part offers a non-conclusive
list of topics in share law, frequently encountered by businesses,
216
See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 63, at 145 (using the title “Legal
Character of Equity” for a section on the characteristics of shares).
217
See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, THE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BUSINESS
FINANCING: A GUIDE FOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 20 (1994) (describing the basic
types of equity securities).
218
See, e.g., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Form 10-K, SEC.GOV (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000119312518057033/d437
858d10k.htm [https://perma.cc/KU4G-H848] (annual report mentioning the
phrase “shareholders’ equity” 28 times).
219
See, e.g., Sui-Lee Wee, After Wanda Deal, Chinese Property Developer Faces
Debt
Risk,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
14,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/business/dealbook/china-debt-wandasunac.html [https://perma.cc/TCL3-Q9HH] (“In 2016, the company’s net gearing
ratio—a measure of total debt to shareholders’ equity—rose to 121.5 percent . . . .”).
220 See Kevin Beach, Reply in thread titled “Equity - companies and corporations”,
(Dec.
14,
2010),
WORDREFERENCE.COM
https://forum.wordreference.com/threads/equity-companies-andcorporations.2007192/#post-10036633 [https://perma.cc/TER8-5C93].
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lawyers, judges, legislators, and scholars. This list is meant to
serve as a guide for further inquiry, tying these topics together under the share law classification.
1. Statutory share law. As mentioned above,221 corporate statutes, such as the Delaware General Corporation Law and
the Israel Companies Act, contain multiple sections dealing
with shares. These statutory provisions, and the myriad issues they cover, are part of share law. Some of these issues
are also discussed below.
2. Share allocation and dilution. Shares are a sensitive and manipulable way to represent claims toward a common pool
of wealth. For example, when new shares are allocated for
less than the economic value of each current share, wealth
indirectly flows from current to new shareholders. This is a
core issue of share law, also addressed in litigation and
scholarship.222
3. Dividends and buybacks. A transfer of economic value from
a corporation to its shareholders, by virtue of them being
shareholders, is known as a distribution. These actions include dividends and buybacks.223 This is a hotbed of legal
issues, some among shareholders themselves (for example,
if the distribution is not made equally), some between
shareholders and the corporation,224 and some between the
corporation and its creditors.225
4. Various aspects of mergers and acquisitions. These are, after
all, transactions in shares. M&A law might sometimes
seem to focus on issues of corporate fiduciary law, such as
directors’ duties on either side of the Revlon threshold;
See supra note 6.
See, e.g., supra note 84; Mira Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 701 (2011).
223
See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 1 (defining “Dividend” and “Distribution”).
224
See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text. The opposite situation is
also possible: if an unlawful distribution occurs, see infra note 225, the corporation
might gain a right of rescission toward the shareholder. See Israel Companies Act
§ 310. This right may also be enforced derivatively by creditors, see supra note 160.
225
See, e.g., DGCL §§ 160(a), 170–174 (establishing mandatory rules to determine when a corporation is allowed to make a distribution to its shareholders,
requiring that distributions not “impair” the corporation’s capital, or that they be
made out of the corporation’s profits); Israel Companies Act §§ 301–305, 307, 309–
313 (establishing mandatory rules to determine when a company is allowed to
make a distribution to its shareholders, requiring, without exception, that it maintain its ability to meet all obligations to creditors).
221
222
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however, for such issues to arise, there has to be some (actual or planned) deal—a share transaction, which must also
conform with share law. For instance, when can shares be
taken away, or even cancelled, without their owner’s consent? When is it permissible to diverge from the rule of
equality among identical shares?226
5. Appraisal rights. Appraisal is rooted in equitable considerations; the power and information asymmetries inherent to
shares make a determination of their true value, when they
are taken from their owners,227 involve more than looking
at their market price, if they have one at all. This topic lies
deep within share law; tellingly, appraisal requires no fiduciary breach.228
6. The distinction between shares and other securities. This topic
is important in the general structure of corporate law,229 as
well as in the preferred share context.230 It is also critical in
accounting: when a corporation gets money for a newly issued security, those funds have to be placed, in the balance
sheet, under either “liabilities” or “shareholders’ equity.”
226
For example, in Unocal, the corporation announced a self-tender offer,
aiming for a large buyback of its shares; the offer excluded one shareholder, who
was trying to acquire control of the corporation at the time. This unequal treatment, of shareholders having the exact same security, was deemed lawful. See
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–54, 955 (Del. 1985) (finding that “in the acquisition of its shares a Delaware corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders”, if the action is not “inequitable”). Federal securities
law was later amended to prohibit a discriminatory self-tender offer. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-4(f)(8) (2006) (“No issuer or affiliate shall make a tender offer unless: . . .
The tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to
the tender offer[.]”). However, unequal treatment of identical shares is still possible in other M&A-related settings, as with the poison pill, where a rights issue can
be made to some shareholders and not others.
227
The question of which shareholders are entitled to appraisal rights is answered quite differently in different jurisdictions. See, e.g., DGCL § 262 (granting
appraisal rights to shareholders voting against a cash-out merger); Israel Companies Act § 338 (granting appraisal rights to offerees in a potentially coercive tender
offer). Appraisal rights may also arise outside of the M&A context, albeit exceptionally. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L. J. 223, 251–54 (1962) (discussing appraisal rights following amendment of constitutional documents).
228 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Importance of
Being Dismissive: The Efficiency Role of Pleading Stage Evaluation of Shareholder Litigation, 42 J. CORP. L. 597, 648 (2017) (“[T]he petitioners in [statutory appraisal] litigation . . . need not plead any breach of fiduciary duty . . . .”).
229 See supra Part 4.
230 See supra pp. 280–81.
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Therefore, share law must provide clear rules in this area.
7. Share-related securities. Such securities include warrants,
convertible bonds, rights issues, restricted share units
(RSUs), and other convertibles. As with shares (and in different ways, suited to the characteristics of each security),
equity is involved here. These securities also include
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and similar instruments, giving rise to issues regarding their owners’ precise
legal standing—in other words, to what extent are they like
regular shareholders.
8. Multiple-class equity, as opposed to “one share, one vote”. This
is a highly salient issue. Even in Israel, where the stock exchange is explicitly prohibited by statute from listing equity
securities of companies with more than one class of
shares,231 recent case law has emerged on this topic.232 All
the relationships dealt with in share law are affected by this
choice: the shareholder-corporation (as some shareholders
are left without any meaningful say on the corporation’s affairs), shareholder-shareholder (as shareholders of different
classes have diverging interests, and might more readily act
adversely to one another), and shareholder-third party relationship (the main third party being the corporation’s fiduciaries, who are often personally interested in the existence
of multiple share classes).233
9. Secondary market share transactions. Here, share law interacts
with securities law. Such transactions may also lie outside
securities law, as in the case of private corporations. Quantitatively, most share transactions are in the secondary
market, not involving the issuing corporation. This topic
includes various aspects of the routine trading of shares on
stock exchanges, in addition to other practices—for example, equity decoupling, where different rights arising from
See Securities Act, 5728-1968, § 46b, SH No. 541 p. 234 (Isr.).
See CC (TA) 40274-09-15 Perrigo Co. plc v. Mylan N.V. (Oct. 28, 2015)
(Isr.),
https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/ME-15-09-40274-859.htm
[https://perma.cc/J9NR-DMB8] (holding that in certain circumstances, mainly
due to policy considerations such as the promotion of securities market activity,
shares of a foreign corporation with multiple classes of authorized shares may be
registered for trading on an Israeli stock exchange).
233
For recent discourse on this topic, see, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Perpetual
Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty, SEC.GOV (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-againstcorporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/HTQ6-ACW3].
231
232
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a single share (voting, dividends, etc.) are contractually
transferred, by a shareholder, to different owners.234
10. Non-economic changes to shares. This topic involves actions
such as a share split and share consolidation (or “reverse
share split”), as well as the allocation of bonus shares. As a
rule, these actions represent no transfer of economic value
from one person to another. Yet, they exemplify how
shares are sensitive to various errors and manipulations.
The seemingly benign “non-economic” transaction might
actually cause a transfer of wealth. This can happen, for
example, when a shareholder owns a number of pretransaction shares that does not wholly divide by the consolidation ratio. If a corrective measure is not taken (namely, the payment of cash or other compensation for the fractional share), some of the shareholder’s claim “disappears,”
or usually, is transferred to other shareholders. Another
aspect of this topic relates to the shareholder-third party relationship.235 Brokers, banks, online financial information
platforms and others may commit errors, often unintentionally, in the context of non-economic share transactions—for example, treating the share price as if it actually
changed. Unless these mistakes are recognized and corrected, the loss of legal and economic rights gives rise to a
legally enforceable claim.
11. Shareholder registration. How does one know who the corporation’s shareholders are? Usually, through a dedicated
list, administered by the corporation: the shareholder register. This becomes more complex with public corporations,
whose shareholders change very rapidly. An important issue in this area is nominee companies, such as Cede & Co.,
who appear in public corporations’ shareholder registers as
“street name” holders. In Israel, the real, ultimate shareholders are also the full legal shareholders, for all intents
and purposes;236 it would be advantageous to minimize any
234
See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) [hereinafter:
Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying]; Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, in
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM 349 (William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery
eds., 2015) [hereinafter: Hu & Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling].
235 See supra pp. 277–78.
236
See Israel Companies Act § 132 (stating that “a nominee company shall
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confusion around this issue in other jurisdictions as well.237
Also within this topic is the issue of bearer shares.238
12. Shareholder meetings and voting. While shareholders are
normally not fiduciaries for the corporation, their choices
might still bind it; however, no individual shareholder can
do so.239 Rather, shareholders must go through the mechanot be considered a shareholder of the [issuing public company], and the shares in
its name are owned by those entitled to them . . . .”, and that upon a shareholder’s
request, the shareholder’s name shall be registered in the issuing company’s
shareholder register, in respect to the appropriate number of shares, substituting
the nominee company’s name). The nominee company is not even a trustee, as it
never owns the shares. It is part of a mechanism related only to registration.
237
Shares are exceedingly sensitive to various misunderstandings to begin
with, and the current nominee system in the U.S. makes the situation far worse,
bordering on the absurd. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Banks Forgot Who Was Supposed to
Own
Dell
Shares,
BLOOMBERG
(July
14,
2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-07-14/banks-forgot-who-wassupposed-to-own-dell-shares [https://perma.cc/92EH-AU6H] (discussing specific cases of nonsensical outcomes under the U.S. nominee system). For an overview, see David C. Donald, The Rise and Effects of the Indirect Holding System: How
Corporate America Ceded its Shareholders to Intermediaries (Sept. 27, 2007),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017206
[https://perma.cc/JLT8-WGSP]. Reform is clearly needed in this area, possibly
requiring changes to both state corporate law and federal securities law, to produce a rule similar to that in other jurisdictions, see supra note 236.
238
The ownership of a bearer share is not determined using a central register, but through a share warrant, which is usually a transferable paper document,
governed by both share law and negotiable instruments law. Expectedly, this creates its own set of issues. It can rather easily give rise to situations similar to those
encountered in the Co-Op case, see supra Part 2. For example, in Switzerland, in
2018, legislation has been proposed to convert all bearer shares, of all private
companies, into registered shares, by operation of law. However, the proposal
includes the following: “After the expiry of the grace period [for surrendering
share warrants to the issuing company], shareholders who have not identified
themselves will definitively lose all rights attached to the shares. Their shares will
be deemed void and the company will need to issue, in place of such void shares,
new shares as treasury shares.” Daniel Jenny & Florian Jung, Farewell to bearer
shares and introduction of criminal sanctions for violations of transparency obligations?,
LEXOLOGY
(Mar.
7,
2018),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f8b31110-c8c2-4099-a0f8043e05d3d49a [https://perma.cc/YAQ6-5427]. Given the nature of shareholders’
rights, as discussed in this Article, it is clear why that proposal is extremely problematic. Furthermore, owners of bearer shares are especially prone to being unaware of their shareholding and not contacting the issuing corporation, thereby inadvertently and unjustifiably being placed at risk of their rights “disappearing.”
There are many alternatives to the excessive proposal quoted above; one would be
adopting a similar solution to that reached by the Co-Op Court: registering the
shares in the names of trustees, or a comparable arrangement, for the benefit of
the unknown shareholders.
239 If a shareholder does individually (or in cooperation with others) have the
power to bind the corporation, or materially influence its course of action, that
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nism of voting in shareholder meetings. This topic is in very
high currency, particularly in the U.S., due to the activist
shareholder phenomenon.240 It interacts with other topics
listed here, such as the relation between share law and corporate fiduciary law. This arises both in director elections,
and in voting on other proposals, as when shareholders
seek to constrain management from pursuing certain activities. This topic also relates to other issues, such as vote
buying241 and circular share ownership.242
13. Other shareholder governance rights. These mainly include
access to information.243 Such rights are necessary to minimize the information asymmetries that shareholders are inherently subject to. This topic has far-reaching implications
for other areas of corporate law, including the conduct of
shareholder owes fiduciary duties to the corporation. See supra note 164. Yet, it is
possible for many dispersed shareholders, in their meeting, to lawfully reach a
decision—even one that seriously affects the corporation—with no prior agreement or coordination among themselves, and with none of the shareholders owing any fiduciary duty. This is another unique aspect of share law.
240
See generally INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM (William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2015); LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A
PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION (2011).
241
See, e.g., Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982) (defining vote
buying and upholding the legality of such agreements, if they are not fraudulent
or disenfranchising); Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 234; Hu &
Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 234.
242
See, e.g., DGCL § 160(c) (suspending the voting rights arising from shares
owned by the issuing corporation itself, or by another corporation, if the majority
of the latter’s voting shares are owned by the issuing corporation); Speiser v.
Baker, 525 A.2d 1001 (Del. Ch. 1987) (broadly construing DGCL § 160(c), by suspending the voting rights attached to shares owned by a corporation effectively
controlled by the issuing corporation). In Israel, this pertains to the concept of vacant shares, also known as treasury shares or dormant shares. Such shares are
created whenever a corporation buys back shares it formerly issued, without immediately cancelling them. See Israel Companies Act § 308. Hence, this also relates to the topic of buybacks, see supra p. 312. Vacant shares provide neither voting rights nor any other right. See Israel Companies Act § 308. The principle
operating here is that it is impossible to contract with oneself; every contractual
relationship (in this case, that arising from the constitutional documents) must
have at least two parties; therefore, a corporation cannot be its own shareholder.
See Israel Contracts Act § 2 (requiring the involvement of at least two persons for
the formation of a contract). This is a broader, more exact principle than that invoked by Delaware law, which seeks mainly to prevent directors from voting the
shares of the same corporation they are serving. In Israel, when a direct subsidiary corporation acquires shares issued by its parent, these become semi-vacant
shares: they provide no voting rights, for similar reasons to Delaware’s, while
maintaining all other rights. See Israel Companies Act § 309(b).
243 See, e.g., DGCL § 220; Israel Companies Act §§ 184–187, 198a.
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shareholder litigation.244
14. Procedural aspects of shareholder litigation. For example, when
fiduciary law beneficiaries file a complaint in court (either
themselves or through others, as in a derivative action),
they may enjoy a shifted burden of proof, placed on the fiduciary-defendant.245 The law recognizes that power and
information asymmetries prevent administration of justice
under the usual procedure, designed for arm’s length disputes. These asymmetries are shared by all equity claimants, including shareholders. How do, or should, modified
procedural rules apply to (non-derivative) shareholder
claims?
15. The relation between share law and the law of corporate purpose.
As discussed above, share law—and indeed, the very existence of shares and shareholders—is closely tied to questions of corporate purpose.246 Under positive law, the forprofit corporation’s purpose is the lawful pursuit of profit.247 Shareholders have an equitable claim toward those
profits, along with the rest of the corporation’s net worth.
This is widely known as “shareholder primacy,” but in fact,
it is simply the corporation, like a natural person, being allowed to lawfully act for its own benefit. Yet, there is an
equitable sensitivity here: for example, if a legislature announced that corporations are no longer allowed to have
profits, or that their assets must go to some stakeholders irrespective of their pre-existing rights, the corporation itself
244 See, e.g., Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 2017 Del. LEXIS 34, at *1
(Del. Jan. 18, 2017); Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 179 A.3d 824, 831
(Del. 2018) (decisions ultimately dismissing a derivative action filed in Delaware,
on behalf of Walmart Inc., after the plaintiffs “did exactly what this Court has
suggested on numerous occasions, namely, use the “tools at hand” to inspect the
company’s pertinent books and records before filing a derivative complaint.”
While the Delaware plaintiffs were engaged in the highly preliminary inspection
stage, which “lasted nearly three years” due to defendants’ resistance, a federal
court dismissed a less factually detailed complaint, filed by other shareholders.
On grounds of estoppel, this led to the dismissal of the Delaware complaint).
245
See, e.g., Michael W. Stockham & Mackenzie S. Wallace, Fiduciary Duty
Litigation and Burden Shifting, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/articles/wint
er2014-0314-fiduciary-duty-litigation-burden-shifting.html
[https://perma.cc/Z2ZU-LKMF] (“The entire fairness standard . . . [requires] the
defendants to prove the entire fairness of the transaction . . . .”).
246 See supra pp. 273–75.
247 See supra note 142.
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might not be the only one harmed. Due to the nature of
shareholders’ claims, the effect of such a decision could be
legally and equitably limited, and it might be successfully
challenged, by the corporation as well as by shareholders.
16. The relation between share law and corporate fiduciary law. The
two are distinct, but related. For example, when the law
gives fiduciaries the power to commit certain acts, such as
amending the constitutional documents, it also narrows
shareholders’ exercise of that power.248 As another example, when a corporation is in Revlon mode, or other situations where directors’ effect on shareholders is not channeled through the corporation, a direct relationship is
formed between its directors and shareholders.249 The interaction between the two fields also appears in situations
where a shareholder, such as a controller, is considered to
be a fiduciary.250
8. CONCLUSION
Classification and precision are important parts of any legal inquiry. Under-categorization or over-generalization can lead to serious difficulties in resolving actual issues, both in and out of court,
involving very tangible rights. As Part 2 above details, the 2017
Co-Op case, which concluded a dispute concerning approximately
US$15 million, is a clear-cut example of such an occurrence.
That case, and the legal conundrum it presented (before being
correctly decided), illustrate how corporate law suffers from a persistent strain of under-analysis: as shown in Parts 3 and 4 above,
we readily discuss issues of corporate fiduciary law, which is the
law of the relationships between the corporation and its fiduciaries,
248 In Delaware, see DGCL § 109(a) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its certificate
of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . .”). The bylaws exist along with and pursuant to the certificate of incorporation. See DGCL § 109(b). Moreover, any amendment to the certificate of
incorporation can only be proposed by directors. See DGCL § 242(b). In Israel,
fiduciaries cannot amend the company’s article of incorporation; that power is
always reserved to shareholders. Directors, as well as certain shareholders, can
propose an amendment, but only the shareholder meeting may affect the change.
See Israel Companies Act §§ 20, 57(1), 58(a), 66.
249 See supra pp. 298–300.
250 See supra note 164.
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such as directors. Yet, we have not previously paid enough methodic attention to a separate field, also at the heart of corporate
law: share law—the law of shares, shareholders, and their relationships with the corporation, with one another and with third
parties.
Although they inform each other, share law is distinct from
corporate fiduciary law. Part 5.4 above proves that for the most
part, shareholders are not owed fiduciary duties. This distinction
is practically significant, given the strict obligations, primarily the
duty of loyalty, imposed by fiduciary law. Under established law,
the corporation itself, not anyone else, is the object both of its fiduciaries’ duties, and of shareholders’ and other creditors’ claims.
Many corporate cases might involve no breach of fiduciary duty,
yet, a substantial amount of wealth may be at stake.
Furthermore, Part 5 above reveals that all the jurisprudential
sources regularly invoked to explain shares—two of them part of
general “law” (contract and property), the other two offshoots of
equity (trust and fiduciary law)—explain only parts or certain aspects of the share phenomenon; none does so fully or flawlessly.
Because shares represent a residual claim, they inherently give rise
to power and information asymmetries, a central factor making
them impossible to address through “conventional” legal classifications. Yet, the total value of shares in the world, their importance in the modern economic structure and human life, and
their prominence within the governance structure of every corporation, demand that we examine shares in a more coherent manner.
When no other source can explain the existence of, or govern
the adjudication and resolution of questions relating to, certain legal phenomena, a “residual” normative framework applies: equity. From its origins to the present day, equity is designed to enable
justice-making where it cannot be reached under “law”—in other
words, through the classifications we are familiar with. Trust and
fiduciary law are themselves branches of equity; yet, the properties
of each preclude them from serving as the foundation of share law.
We are left with equity itself. Unsurprisingly, the word “equity” is
synonymous with “shares,” and “shareholders’ equity” has long
been interchangeable with “the corporation’s net worth,” which is
the size of the economic claim held by shareholders. As Part 6
above explains, shares and equity are related in multiple ways, and
on the most fundamental level. In the case of shares, equity is not a
“complement” or conscionable “exception” to contract and written
law; rather, from the outset, equity is the core expectation of the
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parties to share-based relationships.
The nuanced understanding of corporate law, from which the
concept of share law directly results, also informs other hotly debated topics: namely, corporate personhood and corporate purpose. The “shareholder/stakeholder” debate is often framed as a
dichotomy, replete with catchphrases like “shareholder primacy,”
but this Article suggests there is a third way, strongly supported
both positively and normatively: the corporation, a separate person, exists to achieve its own purpose, which is the lawful pursuit
of profit; shareholders have an equitable (not proprietary or fiduciary, nor contractual) claim toward the corporation; by definition, as
residual claimants, they rank below all other creditors or stakeholders—whose rights are determined outside of corporate law. It
would be beneficial to consider how this more refined account
might promote the resolution of that long-standing, high-stakes
controversy.
Share law, equally with corporate fiduciary law, is a major field
of classification within corporate law. It is the framework for conceptualizing, analyzing, and resolving share-related issues. These
issues have existed since the emergence of corporations, but their
legal treatment has been plagued with various theoretical, doctrinal, and practical misunderstandings. That kind of legal vacuum is
not an unalterable fact of life. This Article, for the first time, proposes the concept of share law, allowing us to treat share-related
issues comprehensively, within a well-defined legal paradigm,
based on unifying principles, and capable of meeting the specific
challenges that shares, by definition, give rise to. Through this
lens, Part 7 above examines a multitude of high-currency topics
encompassed by share law, including dividends and buybacks, aspects of mergers and acquisitions, appraisal rights, multiple-class
equity, shareholder voting and activism, and shareholder litigation. Lawyerly, judicial, and scholarly inquiries into share law
should continue, around the world, on a disciplined, methodic basis. Hopefully, this Article serves as a starting point for those facing other questions surrounding that unique creature of human enterprise, the corporate share.
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